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Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions 
Clear the Air? 
On April 22, 1970, a number of private groups in the United 
States sponsored "Earth Day," an attempt to turn the attention of 
the population to matters of environmental concern. The dramati-
cally favorable response to the idea of "Earth Day"1 suggests the 
extent to which more and more persons are becoming worried 
about ecological destruction. One of the methods of preventing that 
destruction, the obtaining of injunctions against industrial pollu-
ters, is the subject of this Comment. The central focus of this 
Comment is upon the injunction as a means of preventing air 
pollution, but most of the substance is equally applicable to the 
obtaining of injunctions against other forms of pollution.2 
It is clear that the injunction is not a panacea and that there 
are some important philosophical objections to the use of injunc-
tions as a weapon against pollution. The injunction is not a panacea 
because it cannot effectively be used to combat problems of wide-
spread concern. The problems of "thermal pollution," for example, 
are caused by all of the machines which operate in the world; the 
changes in climate which may result from thermal pollution and 
other by-products of technological "progress"3 simply cannot be 
reversed by an injunction. Similarly, the use of injunctions to attack 
toxic forms of air pollution results in an episodic form of attack 
upon the problem. Some industrial polluters are identified and re-
quired to alter their manufacturing processes while others are not 
given this burden. Thus, legislative action is necessary for the 
elimination of some environmental problems and is probably the 
most desirable type of response to all problems of industrial air 
pollution.4 In the absence of legislation, however, litigation is 
preferable to inaction. Successful litigation can alleviate the harm 
caused by some forms of industrial air pollution, and can also serve 
as a catalyst for a more widespread legislative response. Even un-
successful litigation can serve to provide important publicity. It is 
for these reasons that the injunction can be a worthwhile method 
of attacking air pollution. 
It is, of course, true that courts may respond to actions for in-
I. See TIME, April 27, 1970, at 46. See also Murdoch &: Connell, All About Ecology, !I 
THE CENTER MAGAZINE 56 Gan. 1970). 
2. The recent development of concern for environmental quality has not, of course, 
been limited to the problem of air pollution. The Sub-Mariner, for example, has 
recently declared war against the surface world for polluting his oceans. 25 PRINCE 
NAMOR, THE SuB-MARINER 11 (May 1970), at 17-18. 
!I. See Murdock &: Connell, supra note 1, at 61. 
4. See generally Krier &: Neustadter, ECO-Law, UCLA Daily Bruin, April 21, 1970, 
at 6, 8. 
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junctions in ways that are repugnant to the majority of the people. 
The historical background of the National Labor Relations Act 
presents one instance in which that result occurred.5 But the re-
sponse of Congress to those injunctions against unions that were 
obtained before that Act was passed presents an example of the 
reason that actions for injunctive relief against polluters are im-
portant. Whether or not the court decisions are right, the existence 
of court decisions increases the likelihood of a legislative decision. 
To the extent that the court decisions are in accord with the will of 
the majority, there can be little objection to the principle of ob-
taining injunctions against those industries which contribute to 
toxic air pollution. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE AIR POLLUTION PROBLEM 
Air pollution has been recognized as a problem for centuries,6 
but its crisis proportions have been seen in the United States only 
in the last decade.7 Now that air pollution is so extensive, many 
contemporary scientists are exceedingly pessimitic about the pros-
pect for clean air in the future.8 
Throughout the past decade, scientists have assimilated a vast 
amount of data that exemplifies the pervasive nature of the air pol-
lution menace.9 It is now apparent that air pollution damages plant 
5. See generally R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAw 
2-44 (1968). 
6., In England, attempts to control air pollution have been made since 1300 and · ~ 
have included torture and death for those found to be polluters. For a brief history of 
air pollution control practices, see H. LEwrs, WITH EVERY BREATH You TAKE 16-20 (1965) 
[hereinafter LEwrs]. 
7. See TIME, Feb. 2, 1970, at 56-63. Four out of five Americans feel air pollution 
is the most important of all the environmental problems facing the nation. NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE FEDERATION, AT WAR WITH WASTE 5 (1969). 
8. E.g., Hill, Air Pollution Grows Despite Rising Public Alarm, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 
1969, at I, col. 3 [hereinafter Hill); Dale, N.Y. Times, April 19, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), 
at 27. Although automobile exhaust emissions are a major contributor to pollution, 
emissions from industrial processes and other stationary sources pose the most serious 
problems. Anderson, Effects of Air Contamination on Health, in THE POLLUTION READER 
141, 153 (1968) [hereinafter Anderson); Havighurst, Foreword, Symposium on Air 
Pollution Control, 33 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 195 (1968). 
9. The adverse effects of air pollution have been summarized as affecting society in 
several ways: 
[R)esearch continues to provide new evidence that air pollution is objectionable, 
not only for its esthetic and nuisance [effects], which we can see and smell, and its 
economic damages, which are more varied and costly than we had supposed, but 
also because of its hazards to health and safety. 
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88th CONG., 1ST SESS., A STUDY OF POLLUTION 
-AIR vii (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter A STUDY OF POLLUTION]. Further evidence of 
the damaging effects of air pollution has been accumulated since 1963. See Gerhardt, 
Incentives to Air Pollution Control, 33 LAw & CoNTEMP, PROB. 358 (1968): "There is 
small if any doubt that air pollution can and has caused substantial social and economic 
losses. Its role is well documented in experiments, tests, and experience gathered from 
major episodes." Id. 
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and animal life10 and interferes with hemispheric weather pattems.11 
Air pollution also creates a number of distinctly human problems. 
It impairs the enjoyment of recreational activities12 and daily 
offends the senses of residents of urban areas. In addition, re-
duced visibility attributable to dirty air makes air travel and other 
forms of transportation more hazardous.13 These adverse effects of 
air pollution have been thoroughly analyzed. Dr. William Stewart, 
while Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, declared that 
contaminated air is "unquestionably a factor in the development of 
not one, but many diseases affecting literally millions of our peo-
ple."14 Moreover, air pollution can impair personal efficiency 
through its psychological effects15 and can directly affect perception 
and reaction time.16 Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
measure the adverse effects of air pollution in monetary terms, the 
cost in terms of personal suffering, necessary medical treatment, and 
rehabilitation is staggering.17 
Some of the damage caused by air pollution is more susceptible 
to monetary measurement. The annual loss to agriculture as a result 
of contaminated air has been extensive in recent years, and the 
amount of that loss is rapidly increasing; advanced industrial 
processes are producing a variety of new contaminants which cause 
more extensive damage than the pollutants that have been dis-
10. Anderson 142, 145; A STUDY OF POLLUTION 18-19. It is important to remember 
that man's tolerance level may be higher than that of other animal species or of 
vegetation. But since all groups must interact in the environment, emissions which 
affect one will affect all others eventually. Anderson 158-59. 
11. A STUDY OF POLLUTION 22; Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1969, at I, col. 6. 
12. A STUDY OF POLLUTION 22. 
13. This safety hazard is especially significant for air travel. In examining a sample 
of air disasters in 1962, the Civil Aeronautics Board tied poor visibility caused by air 
pollution to six crashes in that year alone, and estimated that as many as fifteen to 
twenty air accidents might have been attributable to such pollution-caused poor vis-
ibility. Id. at 21; Anderson 157. 
14. Hearings on S. 780 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the 
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 1131 (1967). There is 
strong evidence that air pollution is associated with a number of respiratory ailments 
including lung cancer, bronchial asthma, pulmonary emphysema, chronic constrictive 
ventilatory disease, chronic bronchitis, and nonspecific infectious upper-respiratory-
tract diseases, including the "common cold." A STUDY OF POLLUTION 14-18. See generally 
LEWIS 135-50, for a discussion of the health studies that have been done concerning 
pollution and health. It is also notable that specific instances of severe pollution in 
a number of cities have been responsible for illness and death to thousands. See 
Anderson 144; LEw1s 18-20; Cassell, The Health Effects of Air Pollution and Their Im-
plications for Control, 33 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 197, 201 (1968). 
15. LEw!s 143-44; A STUDY OF POLLUTION 22. 
16. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEW, PUBLIC HEALTH SERv., TODAY AND To~ORROW IN AIR 
POLLUTION (1966) [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF HEW]; NATIONAL TB & R.EsPIRATORY 
DISEASE AssN., AIR POLLUTION PRIMER 75 (1969). 
17. The damage caused to health and related forms of injury are far more costly, 
by any measure, than all other types of damage combined. A STUDY OF POLLUTION 13. 
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charged into the air in the past.18 The dollar amount of this loss 
to agriculture is estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars 
annually.19 A great deal of nonagricultural property loss is also 
attributable to air pollution.20 Polluted air has been found to injure 
trees and other nonagricultural vegetation, to speed the corrosion 
of metals, and to increase the rate of deterioration of rubber, build-
ing stone, and other materials.21 
Thus, the present dimensions of air pollution are extremely 
severe.22 Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that the problem 
will become even more serious. The ever-increasing consumer de-
mand for better consumer goods-a demand that expands in direct 
proportion to continuing urbanization, the population explosion, 
18. Certain contaminants have been known to affect vegetation more than 100 
miles from their point of origin. A STUDY OF POLLUTION 18. 
19. National Conference on Air Pollution, Report from the Panel on Agriculture, 
Natural Resources, and Economic Considerations 19 (1962). Smog damage to agricul-
ture has been observed in at least twenty states. In New Jersey, for example, damage 
has been observed in every country and has involved 36 commercial crops. N.Y. Times, 
April 2, 1970, at 16, col. 3. 
20. A figure once developed by the Department of Health, Education, and "Welfare 
is $65 per person per year or about $II billion annually for the nation. A STUDY OF 
POLLUTION 20. Many recent articles suggest that the costs may be much higher. See, e.g., 
J. BREGMAN&: s. LENORM'.AND, THE POLLUTION PARADOX 65 (1966); Wolozin, The Econom-
ics of Air Pollution: Central Problems, 33 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 227, 228-29 (1968). 
21. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEVv. See also A STUDY OF POLLUTION 20-21 for an analysis 
of the costs to stores, hospitals, hotels, and the like for repairs and replacements-costs 
often running in the millions of dollars. As a result of the increased rate of deteriora-
tion of building materials that is caused by air pollution, real-estate values in the 
United States are estimated to drop two hundred million dollars per year. LEWIS II5. 
In the San Bernadino Valley near Los Angeles, 1,000 acres of ponderosa pines have 
been fatally afilicted by smog from the city. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1970, at 16, cols. 1-2. 
22. Some feeling for the dimensions of the problem of air pollution in the United 
States can be obtained by examining the number of people affected: 
[I]n over 300 cities, a total of more than 43 million people live under an air 
pollution hazard that the Public Health Service calls major. 
In addition, some 30 million other people (about 15 per cent of the nation) 
live in 850 other cities with air contamination that is somewhat less severe but too 
serious to be classified as minor. 
LEw1s 2. "About 7,300 places, housing 60 percent of the population, are confronted 
with air pollution problems of one kind or another." A STUDY OF POLLUTION vii. 
It is also interesting to view the degree of pollution in terms of the amount of pollu-
tant material that is discharged into the air. The average fallout of solid material in 
New York City, for example, is about 60 tons per square mile per month; in Chicago's 
Loop, as much as 120 tons have fallen on a square mile in a month. J. BREGMAN&: S. 
LENORMAND, supra note 20, at 54-58. That article includes tonnage estimates of both 
particulate and nonparticulate pollutants for a number of cities as well as for the 
nation as a whole. In New York City, the annual emission of sulfur dioxide from the 
combustion of fuels is estimated to be in excess of 1.5 million tons. Katz, Nature and 
Sources of Air Pollution, in THE POLLUTION READER 163, 167-76 (1968). A medium-size 
copper smelter emits 1,500 tons of sulfur dioxide per day, an oil refinery 450 tons, and 
a coal-fired power plant 300 tons; a cement plant may emit as much as 150 tons of dust 
a day. LEWIS 43-44, 59. The Lewis book includes examples from other sources and 
esimates for various cities. 
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and income growth-and the resultant increase in industrial produc-
tion, will cause the types and amounts of contaminants in the air 
to multiply unless the problem is vigorously attacked.23 Of course, 
even vigorous action cannot achieve absolute purity of the air, but 
a substantial reduction in the amount of pollutants being discharged 
is technologically feasible.24 Most observers agree that pollution 
control cannot be achieved through reliance upon voluntary efforts 
by those who pollute.25 Thus, the extent to which technology will 
be used to combat air pollution depends largely on the willingness 
of the public to act through their governments.26 Accordingly, most 
of the discussion in the pertinent literature centers on the question 
whether direct governmental regulation is a better method of con-
trol than economic incentive.27 Those persons who urge direct gov-
ernmental control have been successful advocates: with the exception 
of nuisance actions brought by private plaintiffs, virtually all of the 
recent attempts to deal with air pollution have been in the form 
of regulatory statutes, ordinances, or administrative rulings.28 De-
spite some criticism,29 this type of direct regulation will probably be 
used in the future.30 
23. Stepp & Macaulay, The Pollution Problem 3, in LEGISLATIVE AND SPECIAL ANALY· 
SES OF THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY REsEARCH, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. (No. 16, 1968); A STUDY OF POLLUTION vii; Dale, The Economics of Pollution, 
N.Y. Times, April 19, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 27. 
24. A single pollution control device on one smoke stack can remove as much as 
28 tons of particles each day that would otherwise go into the air. Detroit Free Press, 
Jan. 27, 1970, at 8. 
Since the passage of the Clean Air Act in Britain in 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 52, London 
has reduced its industrial smoke by 82% and sulfur-dioxide output has declined 28%, 
merely as a result of smoke control. Des Moines Register, March 23, 1970, at 15, col. 
2-3. For a description of the operation of Britain's Clean Air Act, see J. GARNER & R. 
CROW, CLEAN AIR-LAW AND PRACTICE (1964, Supp. 1967). 
25. Stepp & Macaulay, supra note 23, at 3; LEWIS 252-53. 
26. See id; cf. Van Ginkel & Van Ginkel, The Phenomenon of Pollution, in THE 
POLLUTION READER 13, 15 (1968). 
27. Some suggested economic incentives include effluent fees, effluent payments, 
and equipment tax credits. 
28. Havighurst, supra note 8, at 195. 
29. For an indication of possible adverse effects from too strict an application of 
uniform pollution regulations, see Hagevick, Legislating for Air Quality Management: 
Reducing Theory to Practice, 33 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 369, 376-77 (1968); Stepp & 
Macaulay, supra note 23, at 17-21, 37, 40-43. 
30. Havighurst, supra note 8, at 196; Wolozin, supra note 20, at 232; Gerhardt, 
supra note 9, at 366. 
The Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), settled the 
question of alternatives to direct regulation. It operates mainly through the use of 
emission standards; ultimate control resides in air quality regions, and HE'W has the 
power to approve individual state control programs. The use of localized standards 
meets some of the criticism of strict regulations, because it allows consideration of such 
matters as ambient air quality and the economics of limited geographic areas, before 
emission levels are set. For a general discussion of the 1967 Act, see Martin & Symington, 
A Guide to the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 239 (1968); O'Fallon, 
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II. THE RoLE OF PRIVATE LmGATION 
In spite of the trend toward governmental regulation as the pri-
mary means for combatting air pollution, private litigation does 
have an important role in the fight to obtain clean air. Govermental 
enforcement agencies have not been particularly successful in the 
past in reducing pollution,31 and it is unlikely that they will im-
prove their performance significantly in the near future.32 The in-
effectiveness of the regulatory agencies responsible for controlling 
Deficiencies in the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 275 (1968). The 
usual regulation governs the permissible levels of pollutant emissions and the like, 
but many also directly control the use of particular equipment or fuels. Most regu-
lations are promulgated by commissions that have been established pursuant to state 
law and which usually have a great deal of discretion as to what type of regulation 
they may issue. See, e.g., :MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 336.15 (1967). 
One example of a multifaceted control approach is found in New York City 
where there are regulations dealing with emissions, fuel types, equipment, and the com-
petency of equipment operators. Cousins, New York's Fight Against Pollution, SATUR-
DAY R.Ev., March 7, 1970, at 53. Pittsburgh is another city with a very comprehensive 
set of air pollution regulations. See Allegheny County Health Dept. Rules & Regs., Air 
Pollution Control, art. XVII Gan. I, 1970). The federal government has also recognized 
the need for a variety of control methods to limit emissions from federal buildings 
and facilities. 42 C.F.R. § 76 (1970). 
Injunctions are increasingly being sought to thwart the application of air pollution 
regulations. In New York City, for example, about 400 landlords have individually 
enjoined the city's efforts to enforce air pollution controls on apartment incinerators. 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, at 61. In New Jersey, DuPont and Company has filed suit 
against the state claiming that the imposition of a prohibition against the burning 
of fuel containing more than one per cent sulfur is an unconstitutional deprivation of 
the company's property. SATURDAY R.Ev., May 2, 1970, at 60. In the State of Washing-
ton, two citizens' groups, the ,vashington Environmental Council and Clean Air for 
,vashington, are seeking in a class action to intervene in a suit brought by owners of 
a copper smelter against the Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency. The copper 
owners claim that when the regulations dealing with sulfur-dioxide emissions are ap-
plied to their smelter, they are unconstitutional. The citizens' groups base their claim for 
intervention partially on a contention that the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, creates a statutory right to a healthful environ-
ment and that this is enforceable in court by private citizens. 2 AIR & WATER NEWS, 
Feb. 11, 1970, at 1-2. 
31. In commenting on the many recently filed environmental suits, Professor Joseph 
L. Sax stated that "[i]f there's a theme to all these suits, it's an attempt to circumvent 
relatively ineffective regulatory agencies." Wall St. J., March 26, 1970, at I, col. 6. 
See also Hill 61, col. 4, for a discussion of recent reports by federal and state pollu-
tion control officials. For an interesting example of the frustrations which may arise 
in dealings with balky pollution control agencies, see Boyle, My Struggle To Help the 
President, SPORTS !LLUSTRA.TED, Feb. 16, 1970, at 32 (water pollution). 
32. The importance of a private action varies inversely with the amount of 
governmental action. The condition of the environment has recently become a major 
political issue, and consequently it may be hoped that there will be a rapidly rising 
governmental commitment accompanied by meaningful action. It has been suggested, 
however, that much of the recent emphasis on environment is only rhetoric. See, e.g., 
Kenworthy, Nixon's Pollution Policy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1970, at 42, col. I. See also 
Hill 61, at cols. I, 3, suggesting that many pollution control boards are dominated by 
representatives of the very industries that they are supposed to be regulatiµg. 
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air pollution is, in most cases, the result of a low budget,33 a lack 
of personnel,34 and weak or nonexistent enforcement powers.35 As 
a result of these agency difficulties, public enforcement in the air 
pollution field must be selective, and is unlikely to be directed at 
local, sporadic, or nonflagrant violations.36 Accordingly, private 
actions may be necessary if such violations are to be attacked. 
It is, of course, entirely possible that private legal action will 
never have a significant effect on air pollution. But fear that the 
method will not be successful should not discourage its use, for it 
certainly will do no harm. There are a number of functions which 
may be served by private suits. First, private actions may be used 
in cases involving certain rather significant types of pollution that 
simply are not covered by existing statutes.37 Second, private actions 
may be used to fill gaps in an existing governmental regulatory struc-
ture. The latter purpose is likely to become particularly important 
in the near future when the problem of air pollution may well be-
come so severe that the government will be unable to cope with it 
effectively. In that event, private suits will provide a means for at-
tacking pollution violations that are ignored by governmental agen-
cies either because those agencies are too overburdened with work to 
prosecute all offenders or because the particular pollutant discharges 
are considered too insignificant to warrant official attention. There 
may, for example, be an instance of pollution that is minor in com-
parison with the emissions of major polluters, but which is never-
theless injurious to persons residing in the area affected by the 
33. In 1966, for example, the total budget for all governmental air pollution control 
programs combined was $20 million; the estimated need was $72 million. See U.S. DEPT. 
OF HEW 21-23, 26. 
34. Hill 61, at cols. 2-3. The Department of Air Pollution Control in New York 
City alone receives over 50,000 complaints a year. Hagevick, Legislating for Air Quality 
Management: Reducing Theory to Practice, 33 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 269, 385 (1968). 
In 1965 there were approximately 1,200 trained persons working in the field of 
air pollution, but 7,000 persons were needed. Existing training programs are thoroughly 
inadequate to the task of supplying the number of professionals required to meet de-
mand. U.S. DEPT. OF HEW 25. 
35. Hill 61, at col. I. In the rare circumstances in which money, personnel, and 
available sanctions have all been adequate-as in the City of Los Angeles-significant 
control of industrial pollution has been shown to be feasible. Id. at col. 2. 
36. Id. at cols. 2-3 (citing examples of limited action by control agencies in a 
number of cities and states). 
37. For example, although the 1967 Air Quality Act authorized the Secretary of 
HEW to establish air quality regions and ambient air standards, very little progress 
has yet been made in establishing adequate regulations. In his message to Congress on 
pollution, President Nixon indicated a recognition of the problems in the 1967 Act and 
he proposed amendment to it. Notwithstanding this request, comprehensive legislation 
seems a long way off. For the text of the President's message, see N.Y. Times, Feb. II, 
1970, at 32, col. I. The difficulties of establishing a comprehensive scheme are inten-
sified by the proliferation of groups and programs concerned with the environment. 
There are now thirteen congressional committees involved, 90 separate federal environ-
mental programs, 26 quasi-governmental bodies, and fourteen interagency committees. 
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1970, at 33. 
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pollution; in such cases, overworked state or federal agencies may 
not consider it appropriate to direct enforcement efforts to the 
solution of the problem.38 The availability of private relief in such 
a case would provide the aggrieved residents with a means of redress 
for the injuries which they are suffering. Moreover, such private ac-
tions would help to enforce governmental policy, and would relieve 
some of the burden on governmental officials, thereby speeding the 
process of effective pollution abatement.39 Indeed, several states have 
recognized the utility of private injunction suits to protect against 
public nuisances and have passed statutes specifically authorizing 
such suits.40 
Private actions may also serve a significant purpose in situations 
in which there are existing statutes prohibiting the kind of pollutant 
discharges involved and in which there are governmental agencies 
willing to enforce those statutes. In such situations, enforcement 
by private suits may be preferable to blanket administrative en-
forcement of a statutory scheme.41 Present knowledge about the 
ill effects of air pollution is still far from complete, and some writers 
fear that if a solely regulatory approach were taken to the problem 
of air pollution, then quality standards would be likely to become 
entrenched in the law, and would be difficult to change even if new 
evidence were produced that would justify raising the quality stan-
dards or even if improved technology were to make more efficient pol-
lution control economically feasible.42 The ability of courts to hear 
new evidence and to shape remedies in light of that evidence, par-
ticularly in equity actions, leads to the conclusion that courts may 
be more responsive than legislatures and administrative agencies to 
38. On March 14, 1970, Trout Unlimited, a national conservation organization, 
sponsored a conference on water pollution, held at the Student Union of Michigan 
State University. At that conference, representatives of the Michigan Attorney Gen-
eral's office raised the problem discussed in the text, when they commented that 
the office's limited resources and manpower made necessary a highly selective ap-
proach to the prosecution of violators of the Michigan antipollution laws. 
39. An analogy might be drawn to the encouragement of private enforcement actions 
that is found in the antitrust laws, although the incentive of treble damages is clearly 
absent in the environmental-law field. In the area of water pollution control, however, 
the Federal Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1964), passed in 1899, allows one-half of 
the fine collected from a polluter to be paid "to the person or persons giving informa-
tion which shall lead to conviction of this misdemeanor." 
40. E.g., Wis. STAT. .ANN. § 280.02 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05 (1969). Some 
legislatures currently have bills pending which would allow citizen suits brought 
specifically to protect the environment. See note 93 infra and accompanying text. 
41. See note 29 supra. 
42. Anderson 158. The same problem arises if an industrial defendant can defend 
on the grounds that statutory standards are being complied with. Traditionally, how-
ever, an action for an injunction against conduct which violates criininal laws will be 
entertained only if the plaintiff has a personal interest different from the public interest. 
See Goose v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit, 305 Ky. 644, 205 S.W.2d 326 (1947); text 
accompanying notes 140-47 infra. Accordingly, there would be no purpose in allowing 
the statutory standards to constitute a defense, for those standards necessarily repre-
sent the public's needs, not the plaintiff's needs. 
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rapidly changing knowledge concerning the dangers of air pollution 
and to improved control techniques that make stricter emissions 
standards reasonable.43 Finally, private litigation may serve a pub-
licity function-especially in cases involving many plaintiffs and 
important defendants. In such cases, private suits provide a forum 
for the advocacy of new legal theories for controlling polluters, 
provide a means of informing the public about the faftS of air pollu-
tion, and perhaps may help to generate pressure for new and stricter 
air quality laws.44 
III. PREREQUISITES FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
In private suits against industrial contributors to air pollution, 
plaintiffs usually seek only injunctive relief, although in some cases 
a request for an injunction is coupled with a demand for damages.411 
Damages alone are seldom requested, for such an award does not 
prevent the continuation of the harmful practice of discharging con-
taminants, which in most cases is the primary concern of the plain-
tiff. 46 Indeed, if a recovery of damages would be sufficient to 
compensate a plaintiff, injunctive relief might well be unavailable.47 
The continuing nature of the harm is not, however, the only 
factor that makes the damage action inappropriate for most cases. 
Damage action is also unlikely because of the difficulties that con-
front a plaintiff in attempting to sustain a claim for monetary 
relief. In the typical air pollution case, damages are difficult both 
to measure and to disperse fairly among the victims of the pollution.48 
43. In fact, Professor Eric J. Cassell suggests that it may be necessary to return to 
a sophisticated and broadly based nuisance law approach if progress in abatement is 
to occur. He feels that statutory control by dealing with one pollutant at a time is 
inadequate. Cassell, supra note 14, at 197. Stepp and Macaulay, however, seem to 
believe that the best use of pollution control resources requires a more systematic 
scheme for abatement than nuisance law would provide. Supra note 23, at 29-30. 
44. An example of this type of suit might be the 1969 class action brought on be• 
half of all the residents of Los Angeles County against virtually every corporate 
polluter in that county. In that action, damages totalling approximately $500 billion 
dollars were sought, in addition to other remedies. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 
No. 947, 429 (Super. Ct., Cal., filed April 15, 1969). The case was so large that it probably 
was not taken seriously by the court (the judge who dismissed the suit called it 
"Diamond vs. The World'), yet it generated a great deal of publicity and may have 
helped to educate the public as to the widespread nature of the sources of pollution. 
45. E.g., Alfred Jacobshagen Co. v. Dockery, 243 Miss. 571, 139 S.2d 632 (1962); 
Harden Chevrolet Co. v. Pickaway Grain Co., 27 Ohio Op. 2d 144, 194 N.E.2d 177 
(C.P. 1961). 
46. If the pollution is allowed to continue, the payment of damages by the polluter 
makes no real sense. Unlike the water pollution situation-in which purifying the 
water is possible and is measurable in terms of costs, and in which the plaintiff, at 
least in theory, could use the monetary damages to help in purifying the water that he 
wishes to use-the inestimable health effects of foul air will continue to effect the 
plaintiff regardless of whether damages are paid. 
47. See text accompanying notes 124-36 infra. 
48. See notes 9-17 supra and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, damages are difficult to attribute to a particular defen-
dant because, except in rare cases such as poisoning by a single 
pollutant from a single source, it is impossible to isolate completely 
the effects of one contaminating discharge from those of another.49 
Thus, when a damage action is brought, a court is faced with the 
request that it make an award of damages in an amount that is sub-
ject to much dispute and against a particular defendant who cannot 
be singled out as the party causing the plaintiff's injury. A court 
will be hesitant to make a damage award under those circumstances. 
But this hesitance is not likely to exist when the plaintiff requests 
injunctive relief, since it is usually demonstrable that the polluter 
is causing some harm and that the plaintiff has suffered some in-
jury. 
Because an action for damages is usually clearly inadequate, 
equitable relief should generally be available in air pollution 
cases50 unless an equitable defense is applicable.51 In practice, 
however, the extreme nature of the burden that has been placed 
upon the plaintiffs in most cases of this type has prevented success 
in suits against all but the most blatantly culpable polluters.52 But 
today, the growing information about the harmful effects of air 
pollution, the burgeoning public concern for a clean environment, 
49. This is especially true for health effects because individuals are subject to 
many kinds of contaminants for long periods of time at varying exposures. LEWIS 142; 
Cassell, supra note 14, at 197. The major contaminants and their basic sources are 
known, however, and some attempt at catologing their individual effects has been 
made. These basic contaminants include carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, nitrogen 
oxides, hydrocarbons, photo-chemical smog, and particulate matter. For explanations 
of their sources and effects, see generally U.S. DEPT. OF HEW; Anderson 148-53; LEWIS 
1-114 (pollutants and sources listed); Cassell, supra note 14, at 201 (emphasis on the 
effects of sulfur dioxide). The difficulty of isolating the effect of a specific pollutant is 
compounded by the existence of synergistic effects which occur when certain types 
and concentrations of two or more pollutants exist in the air simultaneously, often 
reacting with the sun. 
Most of the preceeding discussion has dealt with the problems of pollution in 
the aggregate. At any particular time and place, however, the seriousness of the problem 
is dependent upon a number of variables. These include the type and quality of 
pollutant, wind speed and direction, topography, sunlight, precipitation, and decrease 
or increase of air temperature. The effect of pollution on an individual is a function 
of concentration and exposure time. In any given suit to enjoin air pollution, it is neces-
sary to become well versed in the relationship among these variables and the geographic 
locale of the suit. It would be particularly important to understand the major types 
and sources of pollution in the area and the effects that could be attributed to them. 
50. The adequacy of the legal remedy, and the requirement that for equitable 
relief to be available there must be no adequate legal remedy, is discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 124-36 infra. 
51. The various equitable defenses are examined in the text accompanying notes 
124-53 infra. 
52. E.g., Gerring v. Gerber, 28 Misc. 2d 271, 219 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1961) (injunction 
denied when odor from defendant's cleaning establishment was no more than what is 
to be expected from that type of business). See note 179 infra. 
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and the liberal development of the rules of equity53 all suggest 
that a trend of greater success in actions for injunctions against 
air polluters will soon emerge. The nature of that trend can best 
be seen by an examination of the basic elements of such an action. 
A. Justiciability 
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power of 
the judiciary to deciding "cases or controversies,"54 and many state 
courts require similar grounds of justiciability.55 Such limitations 
mean, in essence, that courts may entertain only justiciable contro-
versies that are based upon the alleged denial of some recognized 
legal right.56 They also mean that courts may adjudicate only 
genuine disputes based upon specific demands for relief by parties 
who claim to have been aggrieved, and that courts may not entertain 
collusive actions.57 Furthermore, the article III provision of the 
federal constitution has been held to preclude the rendering of ad-
visory opinions at the federal level. 58 
Since the scope of equitable jurisdiction defines the justiciability 
of various claims in equitable actions, the question of justiciability 
of air pollution claims can best be evaluated by considering the 
traditional limitations on equitable jurisdiction. One of the prin-
ciples of equity that has traditionally been stressed, although with 
some exceptions, is that an injunction ·will issue only when the 
plaintiff has alleged an invasion of property rights.59 Today, that 
view is probably in the minority, and most courts recognize that an 
injunction may issue to protect some purely personal rights.00 Never-
theless, there is still a greater hesitancy to protect personal rights 
than there is to protect property rights. In air pollution cases that 
hesitancy is likely to be particularly pronounced since the plaintiffs 
53. Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994, 996 (1965)[hcre-
inafter Injunctions]. 
54. U.S. CoNsr. art m. 
55. See, e.g., Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc., 62 Cal. 2d 129, 396 P .2d 924, 41 Cal. Rptr. 
468 (1964); Gribben v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys. Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 182, 151 N.E.2d 
443 (Ct. App. 1958). 
56. Cf. Tilleston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
COURTS § 12 (1963). 
57. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 251 (1850). 
58. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). Some states do, however, permit 
the issuance of advisory opinions. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 12; Com-
ment, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1302 
(1956). 
59. See, e.g., Chappel v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542 (1896). The property damage 
attributable to air pollution, however, should mean that even this strict requirement 
is met in most air pollution suits. 
60. Injunctions 999. 
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in such cases will probably not be able to demonstrate the egregious 
type of invasion of personal rights that has led many courts to reject 
the doctrine that equity protects only property rights.61 Rather, the 
plaintiffs may have to rely on an indirect threat to health or the 
more amorphous injuries to aesthetic and other intangible interests. 
The burden on the plaintiffs is clearly lighter when an actual or 
threatened economic loss or a direct damage to health is at issue 
than when such factors are not present.62 
One reason that equity courts may be hesitant to intervene to 
protect interests in environmental quality is that such interests 
traditionally have not assumed a position of high priority in the 
hierarchy of human values,63 and the degree of protection that 
equity will afford to a particular interest invariably corresponds to 
the position of that interest in the value hierarchy.64 Because of the 
loosely defined character of equitable doctrines and procedures, 
courts of equity are particularly sensitive to the value structure and 
are responsive to changes that occur within it. 65 The premise of 
equity-that no ·wrong should be without a remedy66-seems to pre-
suppose this sensitivity, since what constitutes a "wrong" at any 
given point in time is in large part determined by the contempo-
raneous value orientation of the society. Thus, while courts of equity 
have become increasingly willing to intercede to prevent injury to 
highly regarded personal interests such as privacy and personal 
security,67 they have not been as willing to use equitable remedies 
to redress injury to less highly valued personal interests, such as the 
desire for environmental quality.68 Fortunately, however, values in 
61. See, e.g., Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924), in which the 
defendant interfered with the plaintiff's privacy in several ways, including listening to 
her private conversations, making false charges against her to public officials, and 
causing her employer to dismiss her. Under these circumstances, the court was willing 
to issue an injunction. 
62. The reason for this difference in burdens is clear. Equity courts traditionally 
did not accept jurisdiction unless property rights were involved, and although the 
courts of equity have, in their evolution, disregarded the traditional per se rule, they 
have retained part of the effect of the historical rule. Thus, it can fairly be said that 
there exists a continuum, and that as the rights involved become more "personal," and 
less tangible, the likelihood of equitable relief declines. 
63. Cf. Stepp & Macauley, supra note 23, at 1-3. 
64. See generally notes 59-62 supra and notes 67-69 infra and accompanying text. 
65. H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 1 (1948) [hereinafter MCCLINTOCK]. 
66. Id.§ 29. 
67. See, e.g., Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924); Edison v. Edison 
Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907); Long, Equitable Jurisdiction To 
Protect Personal Rights, 33 YALE L.J. 115 (1923). 
68. While courts often enjoin pollution when specific property damage is shown, 
they have seldom considered the more amorphous idea of damage to the environ-
ment in general. Rather, they usually seem to accept a "Smoky City" as an in-
evitable consequence of economic well being [Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Co., 
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America are currently undergoing a dramatic restructuring which 
is likely to elicit a response from courts of equity. America is be-
ginning to undergo the evolution of its "land ethic"69 and to recog-
nize that the health hazard caused by air pollution, albeit indirect 
in most cases, is very significant indeed. As the nation is becom-
ing more affluent, production and consumption are becoming less 
important and the importance of environmental values is increas-
ing. Increases in wealth are leading to a substitution of leisure for 
work70 and to a corresponding concern with the environment in 
which that leisure will be enjoyed. 
The first definite indication of a court's willingness to respond 
to this change in the value hierarchy came in the recent case of 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC.71 In that case, a 
conservation group challenged a decision by the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC) to grant an electric-utility company a permit 
to construct a power plant on Storm King Mountain in New York 
State. The conservation group originally sought to intervene before 
the FPC to prevent the erection of the power plant. After failing in 
that attempt, the group petitioned the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit to set aside the utility company's permit 
because the FPC had not satisfied its statutory duty to consider al-
ternative plans that would not adversely affect the scenic beauty of 
the mountain. The court of appeals held that the group was com-
petent to make such a demand: 
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will ade-
quately protect the public interest in the esthetic, conservational, 
and recreational aspects of power development, those who by their 
activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, 
must be held to be included in the class of "aggrieved" parties under 
[the statute]. We hold that the Federal Power Act gives petitioners 
a legal right to protect their special interests.72 
The United States Supreme Court recently indicated its support 
for this reasoning in Association of Data Processing Service Orga-
nizations v. Camp.73 The Court, referring to aesthetic, conserva-
281 Pa. 166, 173, 126 A. 345, 346-47 (1924)], and have denied relief when the pollution 
is of the kind to be expected from the business involved. Gerring v. Gerber, 28 Misc. 
2d 271, 219 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1961). It has even been held that an individual can sur-
render his right to pure air simply by electing to live in a city which has air pollu-
tion. Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 721, 82 N.W .2d 151, 158 (1957). 
69. See A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 221-24 (1966). 
70. For an analysis of the economic principles involved, see K. COHEN &: R. CYERT, 
THEORY OF THE FIRM: REsOURCE AI.LOCATION IN A MARKET ECONOMY 79-81 (1965). 
71. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
72. 354 F.2d at 610. The court noted that Scenic Hudson had an economic interest 
in the area since it had constructed a series of nature trails around the mountain 
which would be covered with water if the utility company's reservoirs were created. 
But the decision did not rest on that finding. 
73. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
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tional, recreational, and spiritual interests, stated in dictum that 
"we mention these noneconomic values to emphasize that standing 
may stem from them as well as from ... economic injury."74 Al-
though Scenic Hudson and Data Processing are both cases of highly 
limited applicability, they may be indicative of a trend in the courts 
toward a recognition of the increased public interest in environ-
mental quality. To the extent that these two cases are representative, 
it is becoming increasingly likely that courts of equity will be 
willing to consider issuing injunctions in cases involving only en-
vironmental interests. 
Another reason why equity courts may not be willing to enter-
tain conservation suits is that suits challenging pollution-particu-
larly air pollution-involve a variety of interests that are public, 
rather than purely private in nature. Judicial tribunals have histor-
ically been charged with the responsibility of alleviating disputes and 
settling controversies between individuals;75 when conduct affecting 
the public interest is at issue, legislative and executive institutions 
have been thought of as the appropriate mechanisms for redress.76 
The traditional view has been that such public controversies involve 
broad questions of policy and are therefore more appropriately 
dealt with through governmental regulation than through adjudica-
tion. Yet important societal problems, such as those posed by air 
pollution, may well deserve judicial attention, especially if the other 
branches of government neglect them, or decline to act. As Archibald 
Cox has written: "If one arm of government cannot or will not 
solve an insistent problem, the pressure falls upon another . . . . 
[T]he need for judicial action is strongest in the areas of the law 
where political processes prove inadequate, not from lack of legisla-
tive power but because the problem is neglected by politicians .. " 77 
74. 397 U.S. at 154. 
75. The United States Constitution, for example, speaks mainly of the judicial 
power extending to controversies involving individual citizens. Art. III, § 2. 
76. This phenomenon may be seen in the provisions of the Air Quality Act of 
1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-57l (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), and in the discretionary power of 
administrative agencies to grant licenses permitting activities that play affect the 
environment. E.g., Federal Power Act § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 803 (1964); Atomic Energy Act 
§§ 101-10, 42 u.s.c. §§ 2131-40 (1964). 
77. Cox, Foreword: The Supreme Court-1965 Term, SO HARv. L. REv. 91, 122 
(1966). Professor Cox also comments that "[i]n the long run the actual response of 
Congress to the Court's invitation is likely to have more influence upon the course 
of decisions than the bare clarification of its authority .••• " Id. This indicates once 
again the importance of the publicity function which is served by court actions. Of 
course, Professor Cox's approach would engender a wave of criticism from the local 
critics of "activism" by the Supreme Court. See Beaney, The Warren Court and the 
Political Process, 67 MICH. L. REv. 343, 348-52 (1968). The notion that citizens should 
be permitted to bring private actions against polluters in order to redress wrongs to 
purely public interests is a novel one; and, in the absence of statutory authorization, 
"[c]itizens or taxpayers have not to date been permitted to bring an action against a 
public nuisance as such, and it has been held, for example, that the device of a class 
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Indeed, there is reason to suspect that the current wave of govern-
mental activism against polluters may waver somewhat and that even 
the present inadequate level of regulation may be tempered as the 
conservation movement begins to interfere more significantly with 
American industry, for American governmental institutions are re-
sistant to changes which encroach upon powerful vested interests.78 
The American system is a hybrid democratic process which exalts 
interest groups rather than individuals. For most purposes this 
political arrangement is thoroughly satisfactory, but it becomes in-
effective when any particular interest group obtains a dispropor-
tionate amount of power. At the present time, it is arguable that a 
disproportionate amount of power is held by interest groups that 
are deeply imbued with the production-consumption concept of 
economic value. It is true that other, less tangible values are being 
championed with increasing vigor by growing segments of the 
population; but in order to succeed in any effective way, these groups 
must somehow influence the entrenched bases of power. Equity 
courts may provide one means for achieving that success; and the 
magnitude of the pollution menace is such that they should not be 
hesitant to exert influence, especially if the other branches of gov-
ernment neglect that menace or decline to act. 
If, however, the plaintiffs in an injunction action base their 
claim on the general nature of the pollution menace, it is clear that 
the action is based upon the notion of obtaining an injunction 
against a public nuisance. Accordingly, it is likely that some difficulty 
will be presented by the equitable rule that although injunctions 
will issue to prevent a public nuisance,79 the injunction must be 
action will not permit them to bring a suit which they could not bring as indi-
viduals." Jaffe, Standing To Sue in Conservation Suits, Sept. 11-12, 1969 (a paper given 
before the Conference on Law and the Environment, Airlie House, 'Warrenton, Va.). 
However, Professor Sax of the University of Michigan, in an explanatory memorandum 
attached to the proposed Natural Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection 
Act which he drafted for the West Michigan Environmental Action Council, states that: 
The idea of citizens suing to protect the public interest is not a novelty at all. 
Michigan itself has long permitted citizens to sue "in the name of the State of 
Michigan" on behalf of the public nuisances. Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated 
(MCLA) 600.3805. That particular statute is limited to such nuisances as houses 
of prostitution and gambling dens, but the principle of the public suit is well 
established and it might well be asked whether the principle might not more 
needfully be applied to the conservation of our resources than to prostitutes and 
gamblers. 
Indeed, such suits are permitted to be brought to enjoin a wide range of im-
proper conduct in many states. At least a dozen states have statutes like Michigan's, 
and Wisconsin (WSA 280.02) and Florida (60.05) permit private citizens to sue on 
behalf of the public to enjoin public nuisances-itself a rather broad concept-
generally. 
78. See Hill 61, at col. I, suggesting that the vested interests of polluters are difficult 
to overcome. 
79. Larson v. State ex rel. Patterson, 266 Ala. 589, 97 S.2d 776 (1957); People ex rel. 
Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938); Attorney General v. Jamaica 
Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1882). 
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requested by a governmental agent rather than by a private interest 
group.80 In many respects, this principle is analogous to the general 
hesitance of courts to determine matters of public policy through 
private adjudications. If, in a particular case, the general hesitance 
can be overcome for the reasons suggested above, then it is entirely 
possible that the rule concerning injunctions against public nui-
sances will also be overcome.81 Nonetheless, it is important to keep 
in mind that plaintiffs in injunction actions involving air pollution 
will encounter serious difficulties with both the reluctance of courts 
to recognize the public interest in a healthy environment, and the 
hesitance of courts to issue injunctions which have a serious effect 
on public policy. 
Fortunately, however, most injunctive actions against air pol-
luters will not be grounded solely upon an alleged injury to in-
tangible interests. As has been stated, the bulk of the cases concerning 
toxic air pollution will now involve alleged injuries to property and 
health as well as to conservational values. Thus, if a plaintiff in an 
air pollution suit is to present a justiciable claim, it will be most ad-
vantageous for him to demonstrate that he has been deprived of some 
right protected by statute or common law.82 If deprivation of a pri-
vate right can be shown, the need to rely upon the public-nuisance 
theory can be averted. 
Furthermore, the maxim that equity follows the law-that a 
plaintiff must have a recognized legal right before an injunction 
will be available83-makes it important that pertinent private rights 
be examined. There are a number of theories under which a 
plaintiff may assert that he has rights which are being infringed by 
air pollution. The oldest and most common theory which may be 
advanced is that of private nuisance.84 An individual has the right 
to enjoy his property free from the encroachment of nuisances 
created by other persons or institutions.85 That right includes the 
right to be free from unwarranted interferences with reasonable 
comfort and convenience in the occupation of the property.86 Thus, 
air pollution constitutes a nuisance if it lowers the value of his 
80. Massachusetts Soc. of Optometrists v. Waddick, 340 Mass. 581, 165 N.E.2d 394 
(1960). 
81. See also w. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 625 (3d ed. 1964). 
82. See 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1338 (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter 
POMEROY). 
83. See Chafee, Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts?, 75 U. PA. L. REv. I (1926). 
Chafee rightly considers the rule to be unsound, but it cannot be ignored. 
84. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 81, §§ 87-92. 
85. Id. at § 90. 
86. Id. 
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property or offends his sensibilities to the extent that it seriously 
interferes with his right to the quiet enjoyment of his property.87 
The real problem with the application of nuisance law to air 
pollution suits lies in defining the scope of the term "nuisance." As 
one commentator has noted, our society is dedicated to growth and 
progress and so not every encroachment upon existing values and 
utilities should be considered a nuisance.88 Accordingly, the costs 
and benefits flowing from an alleged nuisance must be measured 
and weighed. Some relatively slight infringements will clearly be 
permissible and some relatively severe infringements will clearly 
constitute nuisances. There can be no precise formulas for drawing 
the necessary distinctions; but the expanding body of information 
concerning the effects of air pollution and the increasing recog-
nition in the law that noneconomic values are worth protecting 
suggest that it would be wise as a matter of policy to expand the 
nuisance concept so that it includes a number of the harmful results 
of toxic air pollution. Such an approach to the concept of nuisance 
would not involve any reform of the concept itself. Rather, it would 
involve recognition of the fact that the harm which is now known 
to result from toxic air pollution is very similar to the types of harm 
that have traditionally given rise to a cause of action for nuisance.89 
In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of writing con-
cerning the relationship between air pollution and traditional 
concepts of private nuisance.90 Although there is disagreement as 
to the importance of applying nuisance law in this area, there ap-
pears to be a consensus that it is the most appropriate basis for a 
claim in some kinds of cases. 91 
In certain cases a plaintiff will have a statutory right to seek an 
injunction against an air pollut-er causing a public nuisance.92 Bills 
87. E.g., Fortin v. Vitali, 15 Mich. App. 657, 167 N.W .2d 355 (1969); Riter v. 
Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957); Waier v. Peerless 
Oil Co., 265 Mich. 398, 251 N.W. 552 (1933). 
88. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 .AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1967). 
89. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 81, at 594-605. 
90. For quite different appraisals of the potential of a nuisance law approach, see 
Cassell, supra note 14, at 197; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource 
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MlcH. L. REv. 471, 485 n.45 (1970); Currie, 
Trail Blazer-at-Law, TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1969, at 23. See also Juergensmeyer, Control of 
Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1957 DUKE L.J. 1126; 13erger, 
Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 24 WASH. 8c LEE L. REv. 314 (1967). 
91. See note 90 supra. Since legal and equitable claims may be combined, a plaintiff 
may be able to obtain a jury determination of his right to damages. But see Harden 
Chevrolet v. Pickaway Grain, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 144, 194 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio 1961) (no jury 
allowed when damage claim only incidental to request for an injunction). While a 
finding by a jury that defendant's conduct constitutes a nuisance would not require 
the judge to enjoin that conduct [Storey v. Central Hide 8c Rendering Co., 148 Texas 
509, 226 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1950)], it might very well make it more difficult for him 
to refuse to do so. 
92. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
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have recently been introduced at both the federal and state level 
which would grant plaintiffs the right to bring a private action to 
enjoin an act of pollution, and these statutes eliminate the need to 
rely upon public-nuisance law theories.93 Moreover, in those juris-
dictions which have no statute specifically granting a right to an 
injunction, it is arguable that private citizens have an implied right 
to such a remedy. That right may be found in the general policy, 
implicit in regulatory acts governing pollution, that condemns pol-
lutant-discharges above a certain level. There is no compelling rea-
son why such statutes should be read to grant exclusive enforcement 
rights to governmental agencies, unless such exclusivity is explicitly 
provided for in the statute; indeed, the policies underlying such 
regulatory statutes will probably be better served if private citizens 
are permitted to enforce the statutory standards.94 The rule that 
courts will not enjoin criminal acts95 may, however, lead to a hesi-
tancy to enjoin acts which come within a regulatory statute. But if 
the statute is construed merely as a legislative recognition that cer-
tain acts constitute nuisances, an injunction should be available. The 
mere existence of a statute will not prevent the issuance of an in-
93. See National Air Quality Standards Act, S. 3546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 
Natural Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection Act, Mich. H.B. 3055, 
75th Legis. (1970). An act similar to that proposed in Michigan has been introduced 
in New York. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 4. 
94. It has been suggested by Professor David Currie, for example, that even in the 
absence of specific statutory authority, federal standards can be enforced by private 
action. Supra note 90, at 23. The existence of statutory standards could, however, 
have a limiting effect on private action either because such suits might be barred as 
attempts to remedy a public nuisance (see notes 140-50 infra and accompanying text), 
or because it might be held that meeting the standards constitutes an absolute defense. 
The existence of standards and of an agency to enforce them could also cause judges 
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies before allowing a court suit. Such a 
requirement would cause little hardship to plaintiffs if the agency were to act quickly 
and firmly, but past performance by most agencies suggests that delay and equivoca-
tion are more likely. LEwis 254-55. 
The reason given for introduction of a New York bill (see note 93 supra) allowing 
private suits to protect the environment was that state agencies had failed to enforce 
the laws adequately. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 4. The proposed bill in the 
Michigan Legislature (see note 93 supra) allows the court in which an environmental 
protection action is brought to remit the parties to the appropriate agency, but it 
docs not require the court to follow that procedure. 
While the question of pre-emption by federal regulation is still at issue in some 
areas of environmental protection [Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Au-
thority and Federal Pre-Emption, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1083 (1970); Note, Jurisdiction-
Atomic Energy-Federal Pre-Emption and State Regulation of Radioactive Air 
Pollution: Who Is Master of the Atomic Genie?, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1294 (1970)], the 
Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), has largely settled 
the question of pre-emption by federal air-pollution standards. With the exception of 
automobile exhaust standards, the Act allows states and regions to set their own 
standards subject only to HEW approval. As to automobile exhaust standards, see 
Currie, A!otor Vehicle Air Pollution, supra. 
95. See text accompanying notes 140-47 supra. 
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junction that would be proper in the absence of the statute.96 The 
essence of such an argument is that the injunction operates to put 
an end to the nuisance which the activities themselves constitute, 
and that the statute is important only as an indication that those 
activities do constitute a nuisance. 
If a governmental body is itself the polluter-through, for ex-
ample, a municipally-mvned coal-burning power plant, citizens af-
fected by that pollution may claim that the government has denied 
them life, liberty, or property without due process of law.07 Such 
an argument appears specious, however, and should probably not 
be advanced.98 Nonetheless, there is an advantage to the assertion of 
a constitutional basis for relief, because some cases suggest that if 
a court accepts such an argument, an in junction will issue as a 
matter of right.99 
Another potential basis for relief is contained in the argument 
that air pollution constitutes a violation of the public trust.100 The 
essence of such an argument is contained in the theory that certain 
environmental rights are held in common by the entire body politic. 
These reserved rights are limited, but they do include an interest 
in the preservation of a viable biosphere. Since the government is 
the trustee of the public interest, it has a duty "in equity and good 
conscience . . . to act in good faith and with due regard to the 
'interests of those reposing the confidence."101 If such an approach 
is accepted, it may easily be concluded that the government has 
breached its duty, for the smog in major cities and the growing evi-
dence of the serious threat presented by pollution indicate that the 
government has been at best a negligent guardian and at worst a 
fraudulent fiduciary. 
If a court accepts this general public-trust notion, it will prob-
ably be willing to give a private plaintiff some means of making 
the government a more responsible and zealous trustee. One manner 
in which this result might be accomplished is by allowing private 
citizens to bring mandamus actions to compel governmental officials 
to perform their statutory duty to take action against offending 
polluters. Such a cause of action has been advocated by at least one 
96. Goose v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit, 305 Ky. 644, 205 S.W.2d 326 (1947). 
97. The argument is that the governmental unit is creating unjustifiable risks of 
of serious harm. Currie, Trail Blazer-at-Law, supra note 90, at 23. Professor Currie 
also suggests subtantive due process may be used as a theory on which to attack 
pollution. Id. Others have suggested the ninth amendment's reservation of power to 
the people might serve as a constitutional basis for fighting pollution. N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 14, 1969, at 78, col. 4. 
98. Cf. Sax, supra note 90, at 553 n.248. 
99. But see Injunctions 1007, suggesting that courts adopt a balancing approach 
even when constitutional rights are violated. 
100. See generally Sax, supra note 90, at 556-57. 
101. Neagle v. McMullen, 334 Ill. 168, 175, 165 N.E. 605, 608 (1929). 
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noted commentator, and one state court has ruled that a mandamus 
action of this type is judicially cognizable.102 Another approach 
would allow private plaintiffs to circumvent the governmental agen-
102. Professor Jaffe has concluded that twenty-nine states allow any citizen to test 
the legality of official conduct by seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the official 
to perform statutory duties. Standing To Sue in Conservation Suits, Sept. ll-12, 1969 
(a paper given before the Conference of Law and the Environment, Airlie House, 
Warranton, Va.). 
Under federal law, § 1361 of the 1962 Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. (1964), 
allows a plaintiff to bring an action for mandamus in a district court "to compel any 
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed 
to the plaintiff." The traditional rule concerning the availability of the '\\-Tit of 
mandamus to compel public officials to perform their administrative duties is that 
a court will mandate an official to perform only duties that are ministerial in character. 
Accordingly, courts will not mandate officials to perform discretionary duties. See Parker 
v. Kennedy, 212 F. Supp. 594, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the 
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory Judicial Review of Federal Ad-
ministrative .t1ction", 81 HAR.v. L. REv. 308 (1968). Thus, the question whether a writ 
of mandamus may be obtained by private citizens seeking to compel public officials to 
take action against polluters depends upon whether the official's authority is deemed 
ministerial or discretionary. 
In a recent Minnesota case, Sierra Club v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and 
Commissioner of Conservation, No. 662,008 (Cir. Ct., Minn. Oct. 3, 1969), two con-
servation groups sought a ,\Tit of mandamus to compel the Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency to hold hearings to determine whether Reserve l\fining Company's permit to 
discharge wastes into Lake Superior should be revoked on the ground that the Com-
pany had exceeded permissible levels of pollution discharge. The conservation groups 
contended that the agency had a statutory duty to hold hearings to determine whether 
the Company was violating the conditions of the permit. The agency answered that 
it could not be compelled to hold a hearing since such an order would be tantamount 
to ordering it to perform a discretionary function. The court rejected the agency's 
argument and reasoned that the plaintiffs were not seeking to control the agency's 
exercise of discretion, but were simply requesting the agency to carry out its statutory 
duty to hold a hearing. Thus the court held that a writ of mandamus could issue to 
compel the agency to hold hearings concerning the Company's violation of its permit. 
This case illustrates at least one situation in which private citizens may mandate 
public officials to perform their public duties, and it suggests a means by which 
plaintiffs may avoid the rule that courts will not mandate officials to perform discre-
tionary tasks. The standing of the conservation groups in the Minnesota case was 
premised on the statutory provisions requiring public hearings for the revocation of 
an effiuent discharge permit. The court stated that 
[I]t cannot be denied that the public generally has a vital interest in preserving 
the quality of the waters of this state and that the public hearing provisions of 
the permits are also for the protection of the public. A public right has been 
created and can be enforced by the public generally. 
At the federal level, a number of attempts have been made to use § 1361 to compel 
officials to initiate judicial or administrative proceedings. Those attempts have been 
rejected on the ground that a court may not compel an administrator to perform dis-
cretionary duties. In Byse & Fiocca, supra at 348-49, for example, the authors review 
prior cases and state that: 
In each of these cases a plaintiff attempted to coerce the exercise of a power 
which in our legal system is, without question, broadly discretionary; and in none 
of them did he advance a convincing argument ••. that in some other statute 
Congress had limited that traditional prosecutor's discretion. Thus the court 
properly refused to order a United States Attorney to institute proceedings to 
prevent and restrain alleged violations of the anti-trust laws [Parker v. Kennedy, 
212 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)] ••• or to order the Federal Communications 
Commission either to conduct a hearing to revoke the permit of a Chicago televi-
sion station [In re James, 241 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)] or to issue a cease and 
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cies and to file private actions directly against polluters, if the gov-
ernment neglects or refuses to take action.103 
Finally, a number of traditional tort theories might serve as 
bases for injunctive suits against air polluters. For example, the 
emission of contaminants into the air might be considered to consti-
tute a nontrespassory invasion104 of the rights of citizens affected by 
the contaminants. Indeed, it is arguable that the doctrine of strict 
liability should apply to the emission of hazardous substances into 
the atmosphere.105 Although the notion of strict liability is not spe-
cifically applicable in equitable actions, it is likely that an injunction 
would be easily available if the nature of the defendant's act were 
thought to give rise to strict liability. A plaintiff might also claim 
that the act of discharging contaminants into the air violates the 
duty of care which the polluter owes to the public.106 Moreover, 
some courts have accepted the argument that an instance of heavy 
pollution amounts to an actual trespass.107 
The attempt by a plaintiff to solve the novel legal problems of 
obtaining an injunction against air pollution with existing legal 
doctrines may not be a simple task, at least when there is no clear 
nuisance upon which he may rely, and no statute to which he may 
refer. But the very novelty of the issues suggests that courts should 
not adopt a rigid, doctrinaire approach to the determination of 
the question of justiciability. The nature of the injuries that result 
from various types of pollution indicates that traditional legal 
theories, designed primarily to redress purely personal grievances, 
do not take into account the full legal significance of a suit to enjoin 
abuse of the environment. Moreover, weighty policy considerations 
suggest that courts should refrain from the incongruous practice of 
recognizing a wrong only when there is some technical legal doctrine 
that precisely applies to it. In the air pollution field, expediency 
desist order prohibiting the station from continuing to televise bullfighting from 
Mexico City. [National Anti-Vivisection Soc. v. FCC, 234 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. III. 
1964)]. Matters of this kind traditionally have been committed to the discretion of 
the official involved, and "the recently enacted [section 1361] does not alter the 
situation." [Parker v. Kennedy, 212 F. Supp. at 595]. 
It is arguable that if a federal statute created an affirmative duty to hold hearings, 
an agency could be mandated to carry out its functions. In such a circumstance, the 
reasoning of the Minnesota case would apply to the federal sector as well. 
103. See note 93 supra and accompanying text, 
104. R.EsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939). 
105. E.g., Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 20 A. 900 (1890); Holman 
v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (1919). See generally W. 
PROSSER, supra note 81, § 77. 
106. R.EsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934). 
107. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1960); Davis v. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 445 P .2d 481 (Ore. 1968). 
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should be the goal of courts of equity, and ingenuity should be the 
means for achieving that goal.108 
B. Standing 
In conjunction with the notion that only genuine disputes are 
justiciable, the United States Supreme Court has consistently ad-
hered to the doctrine that a party, in order to present a justiciable 
claim, must have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens 
the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends 
for illumination of difficult ... questions."109 Thus, the mere fact 
that a right exists does not mean that it may be asserted by every 
person; the standing doctrine, which is a loosely defined and flexi-
ble110 concept, allows the assertion of a particular right only by a 
person who is in some way aggrieved by the denial or threatened 
denial of the right.111 
The individual plaintiff who is able to show that pollution will 
cause actual or threatened economic loss to him or damage to his 
health, will not face difficulty in establishing that he has standing.112 
But in cases instituted by plaintiffs such as conservation groups, 
who must rely on amorphous injuries to intangible interests, the 
standing issue poses a real obstacle to successful litigation. Yet even 
in those cases, it is arguable that the standing doctrine should not 
prevent a conservation group from obtaining equitable relief. It 
cannot be denied that most conservation groups have a fervent and 
an earnest interest in the values which they represent, and so actual 
or threatened injury to those values seems to give such groups a 
significant stake in the outcome of an injunctive suit against a 
polluter.118 
108. "\\Then discussing new theories as possible bases for relief, many writers suggest 
a caveat: that no one cavalierly bring suit based on a new theory. These writers fear 
that the decision in a badly prepared case could set very undesirable precedent. In 
fact, Donald Harris, chairman of the Sierra Club's legal committee, believes the two 
worst problems in environmental litigation are the use of "half-baked" theories and 
poorly prepared cases. Not only do such ineptitudes result in losing actions, they also 
lessen the credibility of other suits, use up time and resources, and often create bad 
law. Address at the Univ. of Michigan, March 10, 1970. 
109. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
110. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1968). 
Ill. See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 59-60 (1968). 
112. In most private litigation, the plaintiff's interest in the relief sought is obvious. 
See H. HART &: H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS .AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 174-75 
(1953); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS § 13 at 36 (1963). 
113. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Noneconomic values, including aesthetic, conserva-
tional, and recreational ones, were recently mentioned by the Supreme Court as pos• 
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The application of the standing doctrine cannot, however, be 
analyzed solely by reference to the rule that a plaintiff must have a 
stake in the outcome of the controversy. One of the reasons for the 
existence of that rule is the desire of courts to ensure that the plain-
tiff in any particular case will be a representative advocate of the 
rights he is attempting to assert.114 In purely personal suits, the 
plaintiff may be presumed to be a fit advocate since his interest in 
the outcome of the litigation is clear. Moreover, in such suits the 
fitness of the plaintiff is not a particularly important consideration, 
since other individuals will not be significantly affected if the plain-
tiff is less than a vigorous advocate. 
But in actions which are of a public character, it can be expected 
that courts will pay close attention to the question of fitness. If such 
a "public suit" is permitted, :15 the problem arises that any person 
will have the ability to force a defendant to appear in court or suf-
fer a default judgment. When the remedy sought is an injunction, 
that problem is particularly troublesome since a failure to appear 
might lead to eventual imprisonment for contempt.116 Moreover, in 
the context of an air pollution suit, it can be anticipated that certain 
industrial defendants who receive disproportionate amounts of pub-
licity will be subjected to severe harassment through the courts. 
Accordingly, it is desirable to place some limitations on the ease 
with which public suits may be brought. The requirement that the 
plaintiff have some minimal personal interest117 is no real safeguard, 
for everyone has some personal interest in eliminating toxic air 
pollution. Similarly, actions for malicious prosecution118 or the 
assessment of attorneys' fees against plaintiffs who bring spurious 
suits119 are not likely to be effective deterrents, for experience teaches 
that the use of such measures will be too sparing to be effective.120 
Thus, the choice must be made from among three possibilities: the 
concept of a public suit may be abandoned, at least with respect to 
cases involving toxic air pollution; all public suits may be permitted; 
or public suits may be permitted only when it appears that the plain-
sible bases for standing. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). 
114. Most obvious denials of standing occur when the plaintiff is not likely to argue 
the case vigorously. D. CuRRIE, supra note 111, at 65. 
115. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 402-04 (1959). 
116. The severe liinitations on the freedom of an individual to disobey an invalid 
injunction are important in this regard. Those limitations were established in United 
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), and were reaffirmed in Walker v. 
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). But see In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962). 
117. Cf. K. DAVIS, supra note 115, at 402-04. 
118. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 60, at 870-75. 
119. Cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 133l(b), 1332(b) (1964). 
120. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 112, at 96 (1963). 
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tiffs will be effective advocates of the interests which they claim to 
represent. It is likely that courts will opt for the last of these alterna-
tives, since that is the option which permits courts to proceed with 
the greatest degree of flexibility. The decision as to fitness cannot, 
of course, be made in isolation; it will generally be true that the 
more meritorious a position is, the more easily it can be advanced. 
Accordingly, the difficulty which the fitness standard will impose can 
be expected to vary inversely with the apparent merits of the case. 
The language of recent cases suggests that courts will, and should, 
be willing to make this judgment of fitness.121 But it is not easy to 
make such a discrimination among plaintiffs, and no more concrete 
rule can be stated than that a court should carefully examine the 
question whether a particular plaintiff will be an inappropriate 
advocate and should therefore be denied standing.122 Such an ap-
praisal will probably have little effect upon the ability of conserva-
tion groups to bring injunctive actions, for such groups will often 
be the most apt parties for litigating questions involving conserva-
tional values. They will usually possess the expertise and the finan-
cial resources necessary to conduct a vigorous legal assault, and are 
likely to represent public conservationist sentiment accurately, since 
they are composed of a number of citizens. 
If a conservation organization wishes to minimize the likelihood 
that standing will be denied, there are a number of preparatory 
steps which the organization might take. In many cases, conservation 
groups can avoid the standing problem entirely by locating a person 
who is directly and significantly affected by the pollution in question 
and then assisting in a suit filed in his name.123 
A final consideration which indicates that organizations will be 
able to avoid standing problems is that such organizations are likely 
to adopt a strategy of concentrating on a few carefully selected cases 
in order to establish meaningful precedents in the air pollution field. 
Such cases, which will invariably involve major polluters and serious 
actual or potential damage to the environment, will be characterized 
by sharply defined issues and vigorously contesting parties, and are 
therefore the kind of cases least likely to raise difficult standing 
questions. 
121. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
122. H. HART &: H. WECHSLER, supra note 112, at 174. 
123. Although such an approach might once have been thought to be ethically 
improper and perhaps illegal, it appears to be permissible within the language of the 
Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963): "However valid may 
be Virginia's interest in regulating ... barratry, maintenance and champerty, that in-
terest does not justify the prohibition disclosed by the record. . . . Malicious intent was 
of the essence of the common law offenses .••• " See also ABA ConE OF PROFESSIONAL 
REsPONSIBILlTY AND CANONS OF JUDICtAL ETHICS, CANON 2, at 2-3 (1970): "The giving of 
advice that one should take legal action could well be in fulfillment of the duty of the 
legal profession to assist laymen in recognizing legal problems." 
1278 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:1254 
Thus, it is likely that in at least some cases it will be held that 
an injunctive action against an air polluter is justiciable and that 
conservation organizations have standing to bring the action. Tradi-
tional principles would not have dictated that result, for the doc-
trines of justiciability and standing have customarily been used by 
courts to implement general policies of judicial restraint. But recent 
Supreme Court pronouncements advance the theory that those doc-
trines do not have clearly defined limits. Moreover, policy considera-
tions enter into deliberations about justiciability and standing, and 
cases involving pollution are likely to receive sympathetic attention 
by courts in light of the current fervor over environmental quality. 
C.. The Inadequacy of the Remedy at Law 
If a plaintiff in an air pollution suit is able to satisfy a court as 
to his standing and as to the justiciability of the issues he is raising, 
two other prerequisites to the availability of equitable relief will 
become pertinent: there must be no adequate remedy at law, and the 
plaintiff cannot have delayed unreasonably in bringing the case to 
court. It is unlikely that either of those doctrines would prevent a 
decision on the merits in an air pollution case, but it is necessary to 
discuss them since it may be necessary to demonstrate to a court 
that both prerequisites are satisfied. 
It is a traditional rule of equity that injunctive relief will not be 
granted "when the legal remedy of compensatory damages would be 
complete and adequate."124 Accordingly, if a plaintiff in an air 
pollution suit can be adequately compensated with money for the 
injury which he suffers, he will not be able to obtain an injunction. 
The validity of this traditional rule has been challenged;125 but "at 
least in form, the adequacy test remains on the books and appears 
in the case law."126 
The concept of inadequacy is in no sense a clear one. Under the 
most lenient application of the test, injunctive relief may be granted 
so long as the legal remedy is not as adequate as the equitable remedy 
would be.127 Usually, however, the determination whether the legal 
remedy is sufficiently adequate to preclude equitable relief is a 
matter left to the court's discretion. In general, a damage remedy 
124. POMEROY § 1338, at 936. 
125. Injunctions 1021-22. See, e.g., Steggles v. National Discount Corp., 326 Mich. 
44, 39 N.W.2d 237 (1949). 
126. Injunctions 998. 
127. Steggles v. National Discount Corp., 326 Mich. 44, 50-51, 39 N.W.2d 237, 239-40 
(1949). Presumably, if the legal remedy were as adequate, the plaintiff would not request 
equitable relief, 
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is considered inadequate in two circumstances. First, it is inadequate 
if the type of injury suffered is such that the amount of money 
needed to compensate the injured party cannot be accurately calcu-
lated.128 Second, it is inadequate when money damages are an in-
sufficient form of relief because the injury is thought to be an ir-
reparable one129 or, perhaps, because the defendant is unable to pay 
money damages to the extent necessary for just compensation.130 
Under either of these tests, a damage remedy will often be an 
inadequate form of relief in an air pollution suit.131 It is difficult, 
if not impossible, to calculate accurately the value of the damage 
that past air pollution has caused to health, to the environment, and 
to property. Moreover, measuring the extent of future injury is at 
best a speculative venture; the evidence that such injury will occur 
may be clear, but quantifying that injury in dollar terms is virtually 
impossible.132 The monetary appraisal of the injury caused by a 
single defendant's pollution is further complicated by the fact that 
in many instances the plaintiff is suffering damage from pollutants 
emanating from many sources.133 Attributing the correct share of 
that damage to an individual defendant may be theoretically pos-
sible but is not feasible as a practical matter.134 Compounding this 
attribution problem is the fact that much of the injury caused by 
pollution results from contaminants that are the end product of 
chemical reactions among many substances in the atmosphere.135 
It is therefore even theoretically impossible in many cases to ap-
128. Injunctions 1002-04. 
129. See Norris v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 26, 28 (1949). An injury is "irreparable" if the 
victim cannot be fully compensated by any amount of money. Injunctions 1002-04. 
130. There has been considerable debate over the question whether insolvency 
renders a legal remedy inadequate. See, e.g., Horack, Insolvency and Specific Per-
formance, 31 HARv. L. R.Ev. 702 (1918); Mcclintock, Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at 
Law, 16 MINN. L. R.Ev. 233 (1932). The trend of the cases appears to be toward relaxing 
the requirement of inadequacy and, therefore, toward recognizing insolvency as a 
sufficient reason to permit the invocation of equity jurisdiction. See note 125 supra and 
accompanying text. 
131. Although much is known about pollution generally, the plaintiff in any par-
ticular case will have to provide experts to analyze the specific types of pollutants in the 
geographic area encompassed by the suit to determine their source and possible effects, 
and to explain those findings, as well as their meaning in terms of the appropriate 
remedy, to the court. The Environmental Defense Fund will provide experts at cost 
for some types of cases, but often the costs for expert study and testimony are high. 
For discussion of the use of experts at trial, see Sive, Securing, Examining, and Cross-
Examining Expert Witnesses in Environmental Cases, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1175 (1970). 
132. A STUDY OF POLLUTION 13. 
133. See note 49 supra. 
134. With respect to an injunction, however, the fact that others besides the defen-
dant or defendants are also contributing damaging pollutants to the air should not 
act to bar such relief. See Waier v. Peerless Oil Co., 265 Mich. 398, 251 N.W. 552 (1933). 
135. See note 49 supra. 
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portion responsibility among the various polluters contributing 
the original chemical substances. Because injunctive relief operates 
only prospectively, there is less need to be concerned with deter-
mining the precise extent of the defendant's contribution to the 
pollution. Money damages may also be inadequate because much 
of the injury caused by air pollution is irreparable. Damage to 
health, destruction of wildlife, and disruptions of the weather and 
the eco-system generally, cannot be rectified by any amount of 
monetary reparation.136 
A different approach to the inadequacy requirement has been de-
veloped by some courts, which have created what amounts to a rule of 
per se inadequacy in certain categories of cases. For example, a dam-
age remedy is often considered inadequate, and an injunction issued, 
whenever the injury caused to the plaintiff is a continuing one.137 
The reason for this approach is that if the injury is continuous, any 
remedy other than an injunction may lead to the undesirable result 
of necessitating periodic suits by the plaintiff.138 An air pollution 
case seems quite likely to fall within this category. Any other ap-
proach would not only have the result that the plaintiff in the 
particular case might be compelled to bring periodic suits in the 
future, but would also ignore the existence of other individuals who 
are potentially plaintiffs and who should not be required to bring 
actions in the future.139 
A rule of equity that is closely related to the problem of adequacy 
is the traditional view that equity will not enjoin a criminal act 
unless there is a statute providing for injunctive relief.140 There are 
three bases for this rule: first, there is a presumption that a criminal 
136. In most of the reported cases, courts failed to mention the detrimental health 
effects of pollution. E.g., Prauner v. Battle Creek Co-op. Creamery, 173 Neb. 412, 113 
N.W.2d 518 (1962); Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345 
(1924). The failure of most courts to treat health effects and to speak rather in terms 
of odor and discomfort seems to stem in part from a failure of plaintiff's counsel to 
emphasize health factors adequately. With the rapidly accumulating knowledge of the 
harm caused by air pollution, such a failure today would be inexcusable. Health 
effects, however, are not always ignored. See, e.g., Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. I, 12 
(1881), in which the court stated that if a nuisance operates to destroy health, an action 
at law furnishes no adequate remedy. 
137. Injunctions 1001; W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY § 30 (1930); e.g., Donovan 
v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279, 304-05 (1905). 
138. Injunctions 1001; W. WALSH, supra note 137, at § 30. 
139. An alternative to injunctive relief, which has been developed in some cases of 
continuing injury, involves making a present award of damages for future injury 
[e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 
(1970)] or an award of a continuing payment [e.g., Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co., 
154 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 1967)]. See generally Injunctions 1001. Such approaches are in-
appropriate in an air pollution case, both because damages are so difficult to quantify 
and because there are a number of other potential plaintiffs whose interests would 
be best protected by an injunction. 
140. Injunctions 996. 
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penalty provides adequate protection for the interests that would 
be injured by a violation of the criminal statute;141 second, there is 
a notion that prosecutorial discretion is desirable and that private 
parties should not be allowed to interfere with its exercise;142 and 
third, there is a view that some acts are made criminal not because 
the legislature desires to prevent them, but because it desires to make 
those who engage in them pay a fee.143 This doctrine appears, how-
ever, to be losing support; and some courts have recently been 
willing to grant injunctions to bar criminally punishable conduct 
when the public prosecutor has been reluctant to bring criminal 
action144 or when the criminal sanction is a trivial one.145 
Although statutes regulating air pollution are not generally 
thought of as part of the penal code, many of them povide that 
violators may be found guilty of a misdemeanor.146 Accordingly, the 
traditional rule might be interpreted to bar private injunctive action 
against polluters. However, air pollution suits seem to be appro-
priate cases for departure from the rigid confines of the traditional 
dogma, because the available criminal sanctions are nominal and are 
seldom enforced.147 Since defendants in air pollution suits are in-
variably corporations, it is probable that courts will dismiss con-
cern over interfering with prosecutorial discretion or upsetting 
the legislative design. There is simply too great a likelihood that 
nonenforcement of criminal sanctions is not the result of a govern-
mental policy judgment that should be permitted, but rather the 
result of either an exertion of political power by industrial concerns 
or an irrational hesitancy on the part of enforcement officials to 
apply criminal sanctions to corporate entities. 
Regardless of whether the traditional rule retains vitality, air 
pollution suits may well fall within an exception to that rule. That 
exception is that a private plaintiff may bring a nuisance action to 
141. POMEROY § 1347. It is probably true that the existence of a criminal statute 
has very much the same effect as an outstanding injunction. The major difference is, 
perhaps, the greater ease with which contempt may be punished. That difference 
provides sound reason for adhering to the traditional view. 
142. See Miles-Lee Auto Supply Co. v. Bellows, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 452, 197 N.W.2d 
247 (C.P. 1964). 
143. This view is often expressed in terms of concern that the injunction may be 
more severe than the criminal penalty. See, e.g., Miles-Lee Auto Supply Co. v. Bellows, 
27 Ohio Op. 2d 452, 197 N.E.2d 247 (C.P. 1964). 
144. Injunctions 1016. 
145. Injunctions 1017. But see note 143 supra. 
146. See Mix, The Misdemeanor Approach to Pollution Control, 10 Aruz. L. REv. 
90 (1968). Regulations or statutes may specifically provide for criminal penalties or 
they may be couched in terms of public nuisance, the creation or maintenance of which 
is a crime. POMEROY § 1349. 
147. See Hill 61, at col. 1. Some states by statute allow private suits to enjoin some 
criminally punishable conduct. See, e.g., Black v. Circuit Ct. of the 8th Judicial Cir., 
78 S.D. 320, 101 N.W .2d 520 (1960). 
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enjoin criminally punishable conduct if he can show "a special and 
particular injury distinct from that suffered by him in common with 
the public at large."148 In many air pollution cases, a private plaintiff 
may be able to demonstrate that he qualifies under this exception; 
and that possibility is made especially likely by the increased evi-
dence of the adverse effects of air pollution upon health and prop-
erty.149 Many detrimental health effects are particular to the 
individual in that they relate to his own distinctive physiology, and 
property damage is similarly distinct if it involves a particular aspect 
of the plaintiff's land or personalty.150 
Since a legal remedy is seldom adequate in an air pollution 
suit, a plaintiff's request for an injunction is not likely to be denied 
on that ground. In virtually every case damages are difficult to calcu-
late, and in many instances the harm caused is irreparable. More-
over, if an injunction is not issued, the damages are likely to 
continue and to generate a multiplicity of actions. 
D. Laches 
The notion that a, plaintiff's delay in bringing suit may bar him 
from obtaining injunctive relief is often introduced under the rubric 
"equity aids the vigilant."151 The purpose of this rule-the doctrine 
of laches-is to protect the defendant in an equity action when the 
plaintiff's delay has caused the defendant to act to his mm detri-
ment.152 Accordingly, the doctrine applies only when the plaintiff's 
delay is unreasonable under the circumstances of the case and when 
the defendant is prejudiced in some way by the delay. 
In the typical air pollution case, it is doubtful that a defense of 
laches can be successfully asserted. Most of the scientific evidence 
concerning the adverse effects of air pollution is of recent origin and 
thus any delay in bringing suit will not usually be unreasonable. 
Indeed, until recently, there may have been no factual basis upon 
which a plaintiff could have sustained a cause of action against a 
polluter. Furthermore, most defendants are polluters who estab-
lished their industrial facilities long before the detrimental effects 
of air pollution were a matter of public knowledge.153 Only those 
polluters who built their plants after such information became 
widespread, and whose plans were knmm to the plaintiffs, will be 
able to assert successfully the doctrine of !aches. 
148. POMEROY§ 1349. 
149. The current liberalizing of the meaning of "particular injury" also makes this 
possibility more likely. See Injunctions 1014. 
150. See generally MCCLINTOCK § 164; Injunctions 1013-16. 
151. See MCCLINTOCK § 28, at 71. 
152. Id. 
153. See Wall St. J., March 23, 1970, at 1, col. 1. 
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One argument that a defendant might assert in order to obtain 
the application of !aches is that he would have constructed his facility 
elsewhere if he had been confronted with an injunctive action. Any 
such claim of prejudice is weakened substantially by the fact that the 
current intensity of the conservation movement provides at least 
constructive notice that any activities which cause pollution are 
likely to be challenged. Moreover, if a defendant's conduct consti-
tutes a violation of statutory air pollution standards that were in 
effect at the time the defendant constructed his facility, the defense 
of !aches should not be available. No defendant can reasonably con-
tend that a failure of private plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief sanc-
tioned a violation of the statutory standards. A claim of prejudice 
is further weakened by the availability of procedures by which a 
company, prior to constructing a facility, can seek a declaratory 
judgment as to the permissible quantity and quality of emissions. 
Thus, the equitable defense of !aches, like the defense of an adequate 
remedy at law, is not likely to preclude a decision on the merits in 
an air pollution suit. 
IV. THE DECISION ON THE MERITS: BALANCING THE EQUITIES 
If the technical requirements for injunctive relief are satisfied in 
a particular case, the court will proceed to exercise its discretion by 
"balancing the equities."154 This notion of balancing the equities is 
of particular significance in an air pollution suit, since it means that 
the ultimate resolution of the controversy will turn upon the judge's 
analysis of broad policy questions and his determination as to what 
is fair under the circumstances of the case.155 The outcome of the 
case will depend upon the balance which the judge strikes between 
the plaintiff's need for relief and the cost and hardship, both to the 
defendant and to the community, that would attend the granting of 
relief.156 
154. McCLINTOCK § 44, at 383. In the discussion that follows, no attempt is made to 
di~tinguish between the showing necessary to obtain an affirmative decree and that 
required to obtain a prohibitory decree. Though American courts have frequently 
suggested a stronger showing is needed to obtain the mandatory order, the distinction 
is seldom actually applied to suits for permanent injunctions. Injunctions 1061-62; 
PO?,IEROY § 1359. 
155. The question of a trial court's competence to balance all the factors and resolve 
an environmental case is much debated. See, e.g., Sax, Explanatory Memorandum for 
the Proposed Natural Resources Conservation and Environmental Protection Act of 
Michigan (printed and distributed by the West Michigan Environmental Action 
Council), stating that trial judges are quite capable of deciding these issues; and 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), 
in which the court stated that it lacked the expertise necessary to fashion an appropri-
ate injunction for the control of emission. 
156. See, e.g., City of Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Dundalk. 
Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, 137 A.2d 667 (1958). If the judge finds that the costs 
of correcting an air pollution problem are greater than the value of the benefits that 
can be derived from the correction, an injunction will not issue, even though it is in-
1284 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:1254 
Of course the task of weighing relative costs and benefits is nec-
essarily fraught both with value judgments concerning the impor-
tance of some kinds of benefits and with the difficulty of appraising 
different types of monetary and nonmonetary costs. Such value judg-
ments are especially prevalent in the environmental context, since 
it is often necessary in such cases to balance the economic costs of 
terminating a pollutant discharge with the economic and noneco-
nomic benefits that will result from cleaner air. Thus, the value 
predilections of a particular judge may often be dispositive in in-
dividual cases.157 
Before the judge can balance the relative merits, however, the 
parties must present evidence. The case which the plaintiff will 
present is apparent: he will present the evidence concerning the 
dangers of pollution to himself and to the community as a whole.108 
The defendant is then faced with the burden of persuading the 
judge that equity would not be served by the issuance of an injunc-
tion. The defendant's primary line of defense is likely to be a 
demonstration that the imposition of costs associated with pollution 
abatement would cause more harm than would the activities of which 
the plaintiff complains.159 Such a demonstration of significant cost to 
disputable that the plaintiff is suffering some injury. See Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis 
Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 135 A.2d 204 (1957). "Cost" is used in the generic 
sense, not in the strictly monetary sense. Professor McClintock has summarized the 
factors that a court should consider as follows: 
In determining whether to exercise its discretion to grant or refuse an injunc-
tion, the court should balance all of the equities, which include not only the 
relative hardships to the parties, but their conduct with reference to the transaction, 
the nature of the interests affected, and the relative proportion of the interests of 
each that will be lost by whichever course of action is taken. 
MCCLINTOCK 383. 
157. Of course, the court need not accept the exact relief requested by either the 
plaintiff or the defendant. See notes 185-87 infra and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the various types of injunctions that might issue, see note 182 infra. 
158. Such an argument may not be possible regarding community damages. It is, 
however, analogous to the clearly accepted notion that equity can consider potential 
harm to third persons or to the general public from the granting of an injunction. 
For example, some courts have refused to enjoin a damaging practice because enjoining 
it would likely result in a number of persons becoming unemployed. E.g., McCarthy 
v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 F. 927 (9th Cir. 1908). 
Most cases in which injunctions are sought involve injury to only one or a few per-
sons, but in the air pollution context many are being injured. If the plaintiff were 
to bring a class action, the weighing of the benefit which would result from granting 
the injunction would include all the members of the class. Class actions are sometimes 
difficult to bring, however, and it therefore seems appropriate as a general rule that 
if a judge can recognize harm to third persons from granting an injunction, he should 
be able to consider harm to third persons from not granting the i1:1junction. Cf. 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 
(1970), which seems to indicate a consideration of the public benefit to be achieved 
from granting an injunction. 
159. Most economists recognize air pollution as an external diseconomy-a business 
cost that is borne presently by persons or groups other than the businesses 
doing the polluting. They agree that some way of internalizing the costs should be 
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a defendant will not, by itself, prevent the issuance of an injunc-
tion;100 but such a demonstration will often be weighed heavily by 
a court,161 and the cost of pollution abatement may well be substan-
tia1.102 
There are three cost arguments that a defendant may advance.163 
First, he may argue as a matter of policy that the increased cost of 
production and the increased price of the commodity which will 
£ollow104 probably are not justified by the marginal benefits of pollu-
tion abatement. Second, he may show that the cost of complying with 
an injunction would be so great that the imposition of that cost would 
require him either to shut down his operation entirely or to move 
his business to another location. Such action would arguably lead to 
found. See generally Rose, The Economics of Environmental Quality, FORTUNE, Feb. 
1970, at 120; Wolozin, The Economics of Air Pollution: Central Problems, 33 LAw &: 
CONTEMP. PROB. 227-38 (1968); Stepp &: Macaulay, supra note 23, at ll-15. Although 
recognizing that pollution is an external diseconomy, Stepp & Macaulay suggest that 
there are significant limitations on a court's ability to remedy the effects of diseconomy. 
Id. at 12-21. 
160. The Supreme Court, in a case of original jurisdiction, has enjoined the opera-
tion of an entire copper smelting plant because of its air pollution. Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). A recent example of alleged high cost not stopping 
the issuance of an injunction is the issuance of a preliminary injunction barring con-
struction of a 390-mile, $110 million oil pipeline access road in Alaska. The injunction 
was sought by three conservation groups relying in part on the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852; and the order was issued despite 
claims that delay in building the road would result in "unprecedented economic 
disaster." N.Y. Times, April 27, 1970, at 25, col. 1. 
161. See, e.g., Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 135 A.2d 204 
(1957). 
162. See generally Davenport, Industry Starts the Big Cleanup, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970, 
at ll4. But see Gerhart, Incentives to Air Pollution Control, 33 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB. 
358, 363 (1968), suggesting that costs for some industries may be quite low. 
163. The defendant's cost arguments would be virtually the same if there were 
applicable statutory emissions standards. But if the plaintiff is seeking to enforce 
existing legislatively determined standards, the argument can be made that the stan-
dards represent a political determination of the best long-term interests of the juris-
diction and that the court, in its balancing, should accept that determination unless the 
immediate community harm from the granting of the injunction would be very severe. 
164. The effect of the increased costs on the price of goods has been given a con-
siderable amount of attention by economists who have studied the ability of the firm to 
shift the incidence of taxes. The ability of a firm to shift the costs of pollution control 
will depend on the nature of the cost and the nature of the industry. If the costs are 
fixed and the firm is in a monopoly position, it is unlikely that the costs can be passed 
on to the consumer at all. Cf. R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 309-II 
(1959). If the cost varies with output and the firm is in a highly competitive industry, 
there will likely be no short-run effect, but in the long run some portion of the cost 
will be shifted to consumers; the portion which will be shifted depends upon the 
price elasticities of the relevant supply and demand curves. Cf. J. DuE, GOVERNMENT 
FINANCE 264-66 (1963). These conclusions are, however, theoretical. In practice, it has 
been found that even in the short run there is a shifting of costs which increase in 
proportion to output. M. KRzYZA.NIAX & R. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORA-
TION INCOME TAX (1963). This seeming inconsistency may be explained by the fact that 
the assumptions which form the basis of the economic analyses do not precisely reflect 
"real-world" conditions. 
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unemployment, a reduced tax base, and general economic decline in 
the area in which the company is operating.165 Finally he may con-
tend that although the company might not be immediately forced 
out of business, the cost of compliance would be so great that the 
company would be placed at a competitive disadvantage with other 
enterprises which are not required to abate their pollution. 
Any attempt to analyze these cost arguments must take account 
of a variety of economic factors such as the extent of the controls 
ordered, the economic condition of the defendant, the character-
istics of the defendant's industry, and the economic conditions of 
the geographic area in which the defendant's enterprise is located.166 
Thus, it is necessary to view separately the various types of enter-
prises that may be challenged in pollution suits in order to deter-
mine whether any of the cost arguments may be successfully 
maintained. 
If the alleged polluter is a governmental body or a regulated 
industry, only the first of the above cost arguments is pertinent. The 
government can meet increased costs through its power of taxation, 
and the regulated industry can include the increment as a cost factor, 
at least part of which will be recovered through its rate structure.167 
In both situations, the increased costs or a significant part of them 
are passed on directly to the public, and in neither situation is there 
any problem of competitive disadvantage. To the extent that the 
costs can be shifted to the public, there seems little reason for deny-
ing the injunction, for in that situation the public would both bene-
fit from the pollution abatement and pay for it. Thus, the only 
question facing a court in such cases is to determine whether an 
increased cost to the public is outweighed by the advantages of clean 
165. It has been argued that such economic arguments as these should not be given 
much credibility. Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the 
Congress, 68 MICH. L. Rm'. 1073 (1970). See also LEwis 250: 
While Benjamin Linsky was air pollution control officer of the San Francisco Bay 
area, he reported that in 14 years of nationwide study he had come across only two 
instances of the actual shutting down of a plant because of local air pollution regu-
lations. More typically, the plant's investment is simply too great for it to up and 
move. 
166. To lessen the impact of general cost arguments, a plaintiff may wish to point 
out examples of industries which have instituted pollution control programs without 
adverse effects. See LEWIS 245-46; J. BERGMAN & S. LENoRMAND, supra note 20, at 141-42. 
He may also wish to show that adverse economic effects do not necessarily follow from 
even a very strict regulation of emissions. In Los Angeles, for example, rather stringent 
emission standards have been enforced for a number of years without particularly affect-
ing its ability to attract and hold industry. In fact, it has been suggested that Los 
Angeles did not start acting against pollution until there were adverse effects on the 
business climate. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1970, at 45. 
167. Of course, if the rates are increased, the quantity demanded should decline and 
the company would then bear some part of the cost indirectly, at least if it was operat-
ing at the point of profit maximization prior to the price increase. The effect of the 
price increase would depend upon the price elasticities of supply and demand. See 
note 164 supra. 
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air. If there is a pertinent statute prohibiting the pollution, the 
decision should be especially clear, for then it can be said that the 
public has already expressed a desire to bear the necessary costs of 
abatement. 
Similarly, some large industrial enterprises-especially those in 
oligopolistic industries-may be able to make only a modified form 
of the first cost argument. For such enterprises, the cost of abatement 
might be small relative to the size of operating costs and might never 
be passed on to consumers.168 In such cases, the only real objection 
would be that of the shareholders, who would eventually have to 
absorb the cost in reduced profits. The position of the corporation is 
more deserving of concern than is the position of the government 
in the situation described above, for the corporation's shareholders 
cannot be identified with the beneficiaries of reduced pollution. 
Nevertheless, the interest of the shareholders seems to be outweighed 
by the damage caused by pollution, especially in light of the com-
pelling policy argument that the cost of clean air is a business cost 
that should be internalized and should not be thrust upon society. 
If the situation exists in which the costs of abating pollution will 
require that the defendant cease doing business, that concern is a · 
significant reason for denying the injunction.169 Nevertheless, there 
are several reasons why a defendant's economic hardship should not 
necessarily constitute a defense. Historically, such arguments have 
not been dispositive; courts have enjoined pollution practices even 
when it appeared that the injunction would compel the defendant 
to cease his business operations completely.170 In addition, the plain-
tiff's argument that pollution control costs are production costs 
that should be internalized may be coupled with the view that if an 
enterprise cannot survive when it must pay all the costs of produc-
tion, then it represents an inefficient allocation of resources and 
should not survive.171 It would clearly be incongruous to allow 
inefficiency to justify continued pollution.172 If there are undesir-
able consequences that may attend the issuance of an injunc-
168. Larger firms would be able to absorb the cost more easily than small firms 
only if the cost does not vary in proportion to the size of the operation or if the firm 
is earning economic profits due to a lack of competition. See note 164 supra. 
169. Wolozin suggests that the smaller a firm is relative to the average firm in the 
industry, the heavier will be the financial burden of abatement. Wolozin, supra note 
159, at 237. 
170. E.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
171. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 442, 447, 450-51 (7th ed. 1967). 
172. Any kind of regulation will probably cause problems for marginal businesses, 
but that does not mean that the regulation should be unenforced. In the case of mini-
mum wage laws or in-plant safety regulations, for example, a legislative "balancing" 
decision was made, and some marginal producers no doubt went out of business as a 
result; but the view that those producers should be exempt from the regulations has 
never been accepted. 
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tion,173 then those consequences should be considered by the court, 
but should not necessarily be dispositive. 
If the reason that the cost of pollution abatement constitutes a 
hardship is that the company merely lacks the required capital to 
finance the necessary technological changes, methods may be devised 
to furnish the necessary funds.174 While the court itself does not have 
the capacity to provide capital, a judge may take cognizance of 
potential sources of capital or existing tax incentives, and may frame 
his injunction order accordingly.175 
The arguments presented above also apply to a defendant who 
claims that requiring the imposition of pollution controls will place 
him at a long-term competitive disadvantage. Furthermore, the cur-
rent expansion in the nationwide effort to end pollution militates 
against any argument by a defendant that his competitors will not 
be forced to incur the cost of pollution control.176 If the defendant's 
competition is local, the plaintiff may preclude any competitive-
disadvantage argument by joining as defendants all the local pro-
ducers of the same goods or services. If all the producers are 
not polluters, then those that do pollute are operating relatively 
inefficiently and should be forced either to incur the cost of abate-
ment or to cease doing business. 
Another reason why cost arguments may not be justified-for any 
class of defendants-is that the actual long-term costs of pollution 
abatement may not be as substantial as many businessmen imagine. 
173. A tendency to oligopoly might be created, for example, if the number of 
marginal producers were decreased while the price of entry was raised. Similarly, there 
might be an increase in short-term unemployment. 
174. For instance, over 90% of the manufacturing industries facing the greatest 
abatement costs-food, paper, chemical, petroleum refining, and primary metals-would 
be eligible for Small Business Administration loans. Money may also be available from 
the Economic Development Administration. Gerhardt, supra note 162, at 363-64. Cities 
and states might also set up public corporations to make long-term, low-interest 
loans available for pollution abatement. Similarly, it might be possible to approach 
some problems of air pollution control in the same way that municipalities often 
approach the need for industrial sewerage treatment: the municipality either builds or 
buys the control equipment and then leases it to the polluter. Finally, tax: incentives 
might be offered to permit businesses to amortize pollution control facilities. See, e.g., 
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 704 (Dec. 30, 1969). 
175. In some cases a judge might even condition the granting of an injunction on 
the defendant's ability to get capital from some source. Similarly, the injunction might 
require abatement only as capital becomes available. This approach might be made 
more definite if the defendant's potential earnings are examined and an abatement 
schedule is constructed in light of those anticipated profits. 
176. Here again, the imaginative framing of an injunction order could reduce the 
impact of any competitive disadvantage. Abatement could, for example, be ordered in 
progressive stages so that there would be time for suits against other members of the 
industry. Similarly, in highly competitive situations the judge might order only that 
the defendant meet the emission standards of the lightest polluter in his industry in 
the area. 
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Indeed, prompt action to control pollution may be economically 
advantageous in the long run. There have been a number of in-
stances, for example, in which companies have been compelled 
under protest to reduce their pollutant emissions and have subse-
quently found that the control devices literally paid for themselves.177 
Moreover, it seems likely that evidence of the harmful effects of 
air pollution will continue to grow, which will lead to stricter regu-
latory controls and an increased likelihood that plaintiffs will be 
able to maintain successful damage actions against polluters. By 
acting at an early date to curb air pollution, a polluter may be fore-
closing the possibility of governmental regulation and costly litiga-
tion. 
Since the guiding principle of equity courts is discretion, the 
outcome of any particular case necessarily depends upon the judge's 
evaluation of the unique facts of the case and his predisposition 
toward the various interests involved. Predictability is further com-
plicated by the lack of precedent in this evolving field. In most of 
the older cases in which injunctions were sought under nuisance 
principles, the court was limited to t:1vo alternatives: it could either 
allow the pollution to continue or it could completely shut down 
the company.178 Today, however, the technology of air pollution 
control is such that defendants seldom can argue that significant 
abatement would be impossible without closing down their opera-
tion; thus the range of possible relief is greatly expanded.179 
Given the wide range of possible remedies, the question arises 
what standards the court should apply in framing particular in-
177. Much air pollution represents the waste of usable material, and many com-
panies have been able to pay some or all of their abatement costs by using the ma-
terials recovered. Indeed, some companies have even earned a profit by developing 
activities for utilizing their trapped emissions. See, e.g., LEWIS 246-48; J. BERGMAN &: 
S. LENORMAND, supra note 20, at 87-88; Gerhardt, supra note 162, at 362. 
178. E.g., Bliss v. Washoe Copper Co., 186 F. 789 (9th Cir. 19ll); Elliott Nursery Co. 
v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345 (1924). 
179. Cases in the past have indicated a wide variety of approaches to the question 
of balancing interests in this area. For example, the pollution from 50 coke ovens 
operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week, has been characterized as only a "petty 
annoyance." Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 142 Misc. 329, 254 N.Y .S. 403 (1931), 
affd. mem., 336 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932). But other courts have recognized 
the health hazard from oil refinery fumes and required their abatement. ·waier v. 
Peerless Oil Co., 265 Mich. 398, 251 N.W. 552 (1933). 
Many of the older economic and industrial neighborhood justifications for allowing 
pollution no longer seem persuasive. Not only has the evidence of the detrimental 
health and property effects of air pollution increased, but also the pervasiveness of 
pollution in many communities makes a distinction between industrial and residential 
neighborhoods impossible to apply. An interesting dilemma may face a plaintiff in an 
industrial area. The best way to reduce air pollution would be to attempt to join as 
many polluters as defendants as possible. Yet the more that are joined, the more per-
suasive the defendants' community-economics arguments may be. 
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junctions. In most air pollution suits,180 the plaintiff seeks an in-
junction that would require the defendant to apply existing tech-
nology to the control of his pollutant emissions.181 Such a request 
for an order compelling the adoption of available control procedures 
avoids putting the court in the position of requiring that a firm cease 
doing business.182 As a result, a court will probably be more willing 
to issue an injunction than it would be if the plaintiff sought to 
have emissions limited to a certain level, without regard for techno-
logical feasibility.183 Since existing technology is quite advanced 
and is capable of significantly reducing the level of pollutant emis-
sions from any source, there seems little reason for a plaintiff to 
insist on the impossible.184 
180. There would be an exception in cases of highly toxic emissions which existing 
control practices cannot prevent. This type of emission should probably be immediately 
curtailed even if it is necessary to close the plant of the defendant. 
181. A number of cases indicate that a defendant cannot be required to meet any 
standard higher than that which is possible under existing technology. See, e.g., Bliss 
v. Washoe Copper Co., 186 F. 789 (9th Cir. 19ll), and Koseris v. J.R. Simplot Co., 82 
Idaho 263, 352 P .2d 235 (1960), both holding that an injunction will not issue if the 
defendant can show it used the "best known" or most "modem" methods of production 
and emission control. 
For a discussion of the defense of industry standards as a bar to the enforcement of 
statutory standards, see Pollack, Legal Boundaries of Air Pollution Control, 33 LAw &: 
CONTEMP. PROB. 330, 343-48 (1968). 
182. It may be that in some localities existing regulations allow levels of pollutant 
emissions which are higher than the level which could possibly be achieved. Where 
this is so, plaintiff will probably seek only to enforce the existing standards. Even if the 
plaintiff does seek to have the lowest possible level of pollution ordered, it may be 
likely, in the absence of a showing of very severe and immediate injury to the plaintiff, 
that the court will accept the legislatively determined standards as controlling. In most 
cases, such a decision by the court would be sound. The local standards probably 
represent a finding that the ambient-air quality of the area is such that it can absorb 
emissions at levels higher than those technically feasible. As the conditions of the 
area change and knowledge about pollution increases, the standards will change. But 
see notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text. 
Compelling only the use of available procedures is an approach which allows the 
court to shape its remedies. Depending upon the nature of a particular case, a judge 
could fashion an order dealing with one or more of the following: emissions, control 
equipment, fuels, efficiency and proper use of existing equipment, training of per-
sonnel to operate equipment, installation or manufacture of equipment (e.g., barring 
use of a particular type of apartment incinerator). As technology improves, the court 
could order that new devices be used by the defendant. 
183. The 1967 Air Quality Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), requires 
the federal courts in nonemergency suits initiated by HEW to consider the economic 
and technological feasibility of controls. A state-of-the-art approach is also a flexible 
standard which would allow the court to shape its remedies, and to keep jurisdiction 
of a case, and to order implementation of increasingly stringent standards over time. 
The 1967 Air Quality Act also requires HEW to develop and publish information 
on techniques for preventing and controlling air pollution, including data on the cost 
and effectiveness of alternative methods. 42 U.S.C. § I857c-2(i) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
This type of information would be invaluable to a judge attempting to shape a pol-
lution abatement injunction. 
184. This is a view shared by many. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEW 27; A STUDY OF 
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If a particular plaintiff nonetheless insists upon an impractical 
solution, it would be appropriate for the court to find a middle 
ground. The court is not bound to the exact relief sought by the 
plaintiff; rather, it can " ... adjust the remedy to the need"185 and 
may exercise its discretion in any appropriate manner.186 In most 
instances, if an injunction is issued, its scope will be general; unless 
it is clear what measures are appropriate, the offending party will 
be allowed to "experiment" with measures that he thinks will 
achieve the results which the court desires.187 For example, the court 
might frame an injunction, based upon its estimate of the capabil-
ities of the existing technology, requiring the defendant to reduce 
his emissions to a certain level. The defendant would then be able 
to adopt the control method of his choice in order to meet the 
requisite standards. Abatement equipment, different fuels, and more 
efficient and careful operation of existing equipment, might be used 
by themselves or in combination, to lower emission levels. This exis-
tence of discretion in the trial judge is one of the most persuasive 
reasons for attacking the pollution problem by using the courts of 
equity. The same degree of flexibility is found in few other areas of 
the law. 
V. SANCTIONS 
If a court's order is disobeyed, the availability of sanctions be-
comes important. In the usual case, however, the matter will have 
to be considered before an order is ever issued, for a traditional rule 
of equity stipulates that "a court of equity will not issue an unen-
forceable decree of injunction."188 It has been suggested that this 
rule has two aspects: relief will be denied if it appears that the court 
would not be able to discover violations of its decree, and relief 
will be denied if the court would not have the means to punish any 
disobedience which might be discovered.189 This interpretation of 
the rule appears sound, and offers a convenient means of assessing 
the enforceability of injunctions against air polluters. 
There are no major problems of enforceability in suits involv-
ing injunctions against air polluters. A court has power over all 
polluters which have a stationary source within the jurisdiction. 
POLLUTION 42-45; LEWIS 223-36; J. BERGMAN &: s. l.ENORMAND, supra note 20, at 85; 
Yannacone, A Lawyer Answers the Technocrats, TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1969, at 14-15. 
185. Alfred Jacobshagen Co. v. Dockery, 243 Miss. 511, 518, 139 S.2d 632, 634 (1962). 
186. See generally Selder, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16 
RUTGERS L. REY. 639 (1962). 
187. Five Oaks Corp. v. Gathmann, 190 Md. 348, 58 A.2d 656 (1948). 
188. Hearne v. Smylie, 225 F. Supp. 645, 655 (D. Idaho), revd., 378 U.S. 563 (1964). 
189. Injunctions 1012. 
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Thus, with the possible exception of suits involving pollutants dis-
charged in a state other than the forum state, 190 the court may either 
coerce compliance with its orders through civil-contempt sanctions191 
or punish violators of its orders through the use of its criminal-
contempt powers.192 
Moreover, not only are the means available to punish disobedient 
defendants, but any violations are easily discoverable as well. In 
general, the inability to discover violations of an order may be due 
either to a lack of standards by which compliance can be measured 
or to an absence of the means by which it may be ascertained that 
the defendant was disobedient.193 In an air pollution suit, the knowl-
edgeable use of discretion by a judge in framing an order of abate-
ment that takes into account both existing technological capabilities 
and available criteria for measuring pollution can produce definite 
standards by which to determine compliance with the order.194 
Furthermore, those same standards may make it easy to discover 
violations, especially if cost considerations do not prevent the use 
of monitors and masters to oversee the implementation of the de-
cree.195 If such costs are an important factor, the issuance of the 
decree could be conditioned upon the plaintiff's payment of them. 
A court will also refuse to issue an injunction if the complexity 
or magnitude of enforcing it is sufficient to render it unmanageable. 
Indeed, mere difficulty of enforcement, rather than actual impossi-
bility, may be sufficient grounds for denying an injunction, and there 
are numerous cases which cite problems of supervision, or the need 
190. The problem of extraterritorial decrees, although potentially significant in this 
field, are beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Messner, The Jurisdiction 
of a Court of Equity To Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of 
the State, 14 MINN. L. REV. 494 (1930). 
191. Either imprisonment or a fine is an appropriate civil-contempt sanction so long 
as it is designed to coerce compliance or to compensate the plaintiff and is not designed 
to punish the defendant for noncompliance. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 
U.S. 187 (1949). 
192. Cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 428 (19II). The threat 
of imprisonment appears to be especially effective when the defendants are corporate 
executives, as is indicated by the history of the antitrust cases in which jail sentences 
were imposed upon several corporate executives who had conspired to fix prices in 
the electrical-equipment industry. See Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1961, at 2, col. I; cf. N.Y. 
Times, March 12, 1961, at 1, col. 3. 
193. Injunctions 1012. 
194. See note 182 supra, for a suggestion of the types of injunctions which might 
issue. 
195. Injunctions 1012. For example, equipment or fuel could be checked by inspec-
tion, and emissions could be checked by existing measuring devices. See Ludwig, 
Air Pollution Control Technology: Research and Development on New and Improved 
Systems, 33 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 217, 226 (1968); Silveston, Detecting and Measuring 
Pollution, in THE POLLUTION READER 209 (1968). Efficient operation might be, in part, 
enhanced by requiring operating certificates for equipment or by requiring training 
for personnel. 
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for continuous supervision as adequate grounds for denying injunc-
tive relief.196 The difficulty of supervision for a court in an air pollu-
tion suit depends upon the number of defendants involved197 and 
the type of abatement order that is issued.198 Since supervision will 
never be completely impossible, it is difficult to know how much 
weight a particular judge will attach to the degree of enforcement 
difficulty existing in a particular fact situation.199 Nevertheless, the 
level of supervision required should seldom be prohibitive since 
the actual efforts at compliance need not be observed by the court; 
the court may supervise compliance simply by measuring the level 
of pollution discharged by the defendant. Again, if costs are a signifi-
cant factor, it is appropriate to condition the decree upon their 
payment by the plaintiff. 
Thus, enforcement of a decree is not an insuperable obstacle, 
and concern with enforcement should not lead to the denial of 
injunctive relief. In fact, however, it is probably true that en-
forcement measures will be unnecessary. Corporations are generally 
law-abiding entities and will no doubt comply with any orders that 
are actually issued. Indeed, it is only through their cooperation, 
either with courts or with legislatures, that the menace of toxic air 
pollution will eventually be overcome. 
196. E.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 
1967), a[fd., 390 F.2d 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 714 (1968); Peck v. State 
Dept. of Highways, 350 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1960); Passaic-Athenia Bus Co. v. Consolidated 
Bus Lines, 100 N.J. Eq. 185, 135 A. 284 (1926); Edelen v. Samuels & Co., 126 Ky. 295, 
103 s.w. 260 (1907). 
197. Once again the plaintiff is faced with a dilemma. See note 179 supra. The 
more polluters that he attempts to join as defendants, the more severe become the 
problems of enforcement. Perhaps by joining only those of a particular industry or 
only those responsible for a particular type of pollution in any one case, the plaintiff 
can reduce the court's fear of enforcement problems, because the measures necessary 
for ensuring that the defendants carry out an abatement order would be basically 
the same for each. 
198. See note 195 supra. The amount of effort necessary to ensure compliance with 
an order respecting the installation and use of abatement equipment, for example, 
would be less than that necessary to ensure continued low emissions without requiring 
any particular method for achieving them. But see note 29 supra, suggesting that any-
thing other than generally worded abatement requirements leads to potentially in-
efficient use of resources. 
199. There have been cases in which controls were enforced, although they have 
usually involved only one defendant. See note 179 supra. On the other hand, some 
cases simply frighten judges away. See, e.g., the $500 billion damage and injunction 
suit brought in Los Angeles in which the judge in dismissing the case, said that it 
was beyond the court's competence. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., No. 947,429 
(Super. Ct., Cal., filed April 15, 1969). 
It has been suggested that when a violation of constitutional rights requires an 
injunction, courts worry less about enforcement problems. Injunctions 1012-13 (citing 
civil rights and reapportionment cases). If the legal right upon which an air pollution 
case rests is a constitutional one, this, of course, may mean that an injunction will 
issue. See notes 97-99 supra and accompanying text. 
